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Abstract 
What is motivation and how does it work? Where do goals come from and how do they 
vary within and between species and individuals? Why do we prefer some things over 
others? MEDO is a theoretical framework for understanding these questions in abstract 
terms, as well as for generating and evaluating specific hypotheses that seek to explain 
goal-oriented behavior. MEDO views preferences as selective pressures influencing the 
likelihood of particular outcomes. With respect to biological organisms, these patterns 
must compete and cooperate in shaping system evolution. To the extent that shaping 
processes are themselves altered by experience, this enables feedback relationships where 
histories of reward and punishment can impact future motivation. In this way, various 
biases can undergo either amplification or attenuation, resulting in preferences and 
behavioral orientations of varying degrees of inter-temporal and inter-situational stability. 
MEDO specifically models all shaping dynamics in terms of natural selection operating on 
multiple levels—genetic, neural, and cultural—and even considers aspects of development 
to themselves be evolutionary processes. Thus, MEDO reflects a kind of generalized 
Darwinism, in that it assumes that natural selection provides a common principle for 
understanding the emergence of complexity within all dynamical systems in which 
replication, variation, and selection occur. However, MEDO combines this evolutionary 
perspective with economic decision theory, which describes both the preferences 
underlying individual choices, as well as the preferences underlying choices made by 
engineers in designing optimized systems. In this way, MEDO uses economic decision 
theory to describe goal-oriented behaviors as well as the interacting evolutionary 
optimization processes from which they emerge. (Please note: this manuscript was written 
and finalized in 2012.) 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The aim of scientific explanation throughout the ages has been unification, i.e. the 
comprehending of a maximum of facts and regularities in terms of a minimum of theoretical 
concepts and assumptions.” 
 –Herbert Feigl (1902-1988) 
What is motivation and how does it work? Where do goals come from and how do they 
vary within and between species and individuals? Why do we prefer some things and not 
others? Multilevel Evolutionary Developmental Optimization (MEDO) is a theoretical 
framework for understanding these questions in abstract terms, as well as for generating 
and evaluating specific hypotheses that seek to explain the characteristics, origins, and 
transformations of goal-oriented behavior. 
MEDO views preferences as selective processes influencing the likelihood of particular 
outcomes, which are more or less consistent with the dynamics underlying those 
influences. With respect to biological organisms, since different preferences direct 
individuals towards goals that can be compatible or incompatible to varying degrees, these 
patterns must compete and cooperate in shaping system evolution. To the extent that 
shaping processes are themselves altered by experience, this enables feedback 
relationships where histories of reward and punishment can impact future motivation. In 
this way, various biases can undergo either amplification or attenuation of the degree to 
which different outcomes are valued, potentially resulting in enduring preferences and 
orientations. 
MEDO specifically models all shaping dynamics in terms of natural selection operating on 
multiple levels—genetic, neural, and cultural—and even considers aspects of development 
to themselves be evolutionary processes. Thus, MEDO reflects a kind of generalized 
Darwinism, in that it assumes that natural selection provides a common principle for 
understanding the emergence of complexity within all dynamical systems in which 
replication, variation, and selection occur, regardless of the specific details of mechanistic 
implementation (Aldrich et al., 2008; Campbell, 2009; R. Dawkins, 1983; Nelson, 2007). 
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However, MEDO combines this evolutionary perspective with economic decision theory, 
which describes both the preferences underlying individual choices, as well as the 
preferences underlying choices made by engineers in designing optimized systems (Berger, 
1985; Coello, Dehuri, & Ghosh, 2009; Davies, Watson, Mills, Buckley, & Noble, 2011; Davies 
et al., 2011; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Lewis, Chen, & Schmidt, 2006; Marshall, 1925; Pine et 
al., 2009; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). In this way, MEDO uses economic decision 
theory to describe goal-oriented behaviors, as well as the interacting evolutionary 
optimization processes from which they emerge. 
MULTILEVEL EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTAL OPTIMIZATION (MEDO): A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK COMBINING ECONOMIC DECISION THEORY AND 
GENERALIZED DARWINISM 
MEDO: PREFERENCES AS SELEC TIVE DYNAMICS; SELECTIVE DYNAMICS AS 
PREFERENCES 
ECONOMIC DECISION THEORY 
ECONOMIC DECISION THEORY, EXPECTED UTILITY, AND PREFERENCES 
“Utility is taken to be correlative to Desire or Want. It has been already argued that desires 
cannot be measured directly, but only indirectly, by the outward phenomena to which they 
give rise: and that in those cases with which economics is chiefly concerned the measure is 
found in the price which a person is willing to pay for the fulfillment or satisfaction of his 
desire.” 
 –Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) 
In order to understand goal-oriented behavior, MEDO utilizes and expands upon 
conceptual frameworks previously developed for analyzing economic choices (Marshall, 
1925; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Economic decision theory (EDT) is the 
dominant theoretical paradigm of microeconomics, but it has also been extended to 
political science, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, and even philosophy (Scott, 2010). At 
its core, EDT explains goal-oriented behavior as consisting of motivated choices made by 
individual agents. These choices are goal-oriented in that actions are selected based on the 
degree to which agents differentially value (i.e., prefer) particular outcomes, as well as 
beliefs about the relative likelihoods with which these outcomes will result from particular 
actions. EDT considers agents to be “rational” to the extent that choices maximize overall 
value (i.e., utility). Choice utility can be estimated by expected value analyses that integrate 
the desirability of all possible outcomes, weighted by the respective probabilities with 
which they are likely to occur. 
For the sake of illustration, let us consider a human-like agent choosing between apples or 
oranges to satiate feelings of hunger. In addition to ascribing value to actions where 
outcomes alleviate the pain of hunger, the agent believes that the amount of pleasure it 
experiences will be determined by the manner in which these desires are satiated. That is, 
the agent has specific beliefs about the value of anticipated experiences resulting from 
different choices (i.e., expected utility), the accuracy of which will depend on the actual 
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experiences associated with choices (i.e., experienced utility). Considering that different 
pieces of fruit vary in quality, there is also uncertainty in the expectation that a particular 
selection will maximize experienced utility. In this way, each fruit selection represents a 
kind of lottery where identical choices can result in discrepant outcomes. Nonetheless, 
even though anticipated pleasure and pain may not coincide with actual experience in any 
given instance, a rational agent will choose depending on the expected utility associated 
with different choices. 
More specifically, agents typically value increased pleasure or decreased pain as having 
positive expected utility, and devalue increased pain or decreased pleasure as having 
negative expected utility. For example, if an agent previously experienced greater pleasure 
increases from apples compared to oranges, then it may assign a higher positive expected 
utility to apple selections. Alternatively, if an agent has previously experienced greater pain 
increases with oranges compared to apples—e.g. experiencing an allergic reaction—then it 
may assign a higher negative expected utility to orange selections. In either of these cases, a 
hungry and rational agent would select foods where outcomes are expected to maximize 
overall pleasure and minimize overall pain. 
These differential expected utilities (i.e., preferences) can be represented by abstract 
mathematical expressions known as utility functions, which specify relative valuations of 
different outcomes. Theoretically, these functions correspond to likelihoods with which 
rational agents will make various choices in situations involving preferred outcomes. 
Utility functions can be estimated from both explicitly stated preferences—to the degree 
that subjective reports are accurate—as well as from observed choices (i.e., revealed 
preferences) (Samuelson, 1938). However, as with all models, these empirically derived 
utility functions only imperfectly estimate the unobservable variables (i.e., latent variables) 
of an agent’s actual preferences. Additionally, these approximations are necessarily limited 
to the extent that revealed preferences are incomplete measures of the overall value 
systems determining expected utilities. That is, since choices have different consequences 
in different circumstances, the magnitude of individual preferences can depend on an 
indeterminate number of context-specific factors. 
With respect to our hungry agent, its preferences for apples and oranges in varying 
circumstances could be specified in a utility function for relative fruit valuations. To the 
extent that the agent is rational, this function would predict the likelihoods of its choices in 
different situations, and could be estimated from stated food preferences as well as food-
selecting behaviors. However, even under an extremely simple analysis only concerned 
with present enjoyment, foods may be differentially valued in different combinations, such 
that preferences revealed by particular actions or statements might not provide an 
accurate description of its actual utility function. Although there may be a simple 
relationship describing the value assigned to each additional apple or orange, the 
idiosyncratic preferences of an agent may be far more complicated. Further, the value of 
eating a particular kind of food may vary with needs for calories and nutrients, anticipation 
of the availability of nutrition in the future, concerns for health and appearance, or 
numerous other factors that could impact expected utility. Over-simplified utility functions 
can be useful for modeling preferences within limited domains, but in order to predict food 
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choices accurately, these different kinds of value must all be considered. Unfortunately for 
economists, this goal is unattainable in light of the unbounded complexity of potential value 
systems. 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND SUBOPTIMAL CHOICES 
“The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation 
depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing 
expected upon its happening.” 
–Thomas Bayes (1701-1761) 
The imperfect rationality of agents further limits the reliability of estimated utility 
functions. That is, although optimal utility maximization may be desired, agents have 
necessarily limited accuracy when inferring the actual likelihoods of relevant action-
outcome associations. Thus, agents necessarily exhibit bounded rationality in that they 
deviate from the unattainable ideal of integrating all relevant information into a single 
probabilistic model (B. D. Jones, 1999; Simon, 1955). Further obstacles to rational 
optimality include reasoning errors from cognitive limitations, reliance upon imperfect 
heuristics, and emotion-driven biases (Daniel Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Daniel Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2007; Simon, Egidi, Viale, & Marris, 2008). 
To return to our hungry agent, bounded rationality can compromise utility maximization in 
numerous and varied ways. For example, the agent may not realize that a particular batch 
of oranges was grown under optimal conditions for maximizing nutrition and flavor. 
Alternatively, it may think that apple-growing conditions were ideal, when in fact the high 
humidity was also ideal for a particular species of apple-infesting fungus. Further, the agent 
may not realize that it has a vitamin C deficiency that will lead to health problems if not 
remedied, or that pesticide residues on apple skins increase the risk of diseases to which 
the agent may be particularly vulnerable. The agent may fail to integrate these factors 
because of a lack of available information, insufficient mental capacity, or perhaps some 
sort of irrational prejudice against oranges or bias in favor of apples. Thus, multiple factors 
can contribute to our agent being mistaken in its beliefs about the expected utilities of 
various choices and their associated outcomes. 
If choices are compromised by ignorance or irrationality, then empirically-derived utility 
functions will inaccurately model value-consistent preferences to the extent that they do 
not account for these factors. Although such considerations limit the ability of economists 
to predict choices, attempts to more accurately model human action in behavioral 
economics are still grounded in EDT as a kind of default null-hypothesis (D. Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). That is, even when theories emphasize the 
bounds of reason, these models are still expressed in terms of deviations from optimal 
utility maximization. 
ACTION SELECTION, EXPECTATIONS, AND EVOLVING PREFERENCES 
“The consequences of an act affect the probability of it's occurring again.” 
 –B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) 
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For biological agents, choices emerge from underlying patterns of neural activity that 
ultimately result in specific motor sequences. However, since actions must be coordinated 
in order to produce coherent behavior and achieve particular outcomes, there is a sense in 
which corresponding neural representations compete and cooperate in determining which 
patterns will be expressed in which order within hierarchies of actions and sub-actions. 
Action selection—the process of arbitrating among interacting behavioral representations 
in determining what to do next—remains a central topic of investigation for neuroscience, 
as well as in the fields of artificial intelligence and ethology (Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 
2001; Houk et al., 2007; Humphries, Gurney, & Prescott, 2007).  
For example, if our hungry agent encounters apple and orange trees in the same location, 
concurrently elevated levels of neural activity may occur for representations involved in 
obtaining and consuming these various fruits. However, since these patterns share a 
common embodiment, they cannot simultaneously direct effector systems without 
compromising food obtainment (e.g. attempting to climb both trees at the same time). In 
any given moment, neural representations for specific actions need to be prioritized (i.e., 
selected) depending on which outcomes are more likely to maximize utility. In this way, the 
processes involved in selecting actions are continuous with those involved in preferring 
them. Subjectively, the magnitude of differential expected utility corresponds to the 
strength with which particular outcomes are preferred, as well as the degree of motivation 
for realizing these desires. 
In terms of motivated behavior, outcomes are valued as rewarding or devalued as punishing 
if they respectively increase or decrease overall expected utility. That is, rational agents 
will be more likely to select options they expect to increase rewarding experiences and 
decrease punishing experiences, thereby optimizing choices for utility maximization. In an 
operant conditioning framework (Skinner, 1938), the impacts of outcomes are deemed 
reinforcers or punishers depending on whether they respectively increase or decrease the 
likelihood of behaviors. Reinforcement and punishment—as well as their influences on 
action-tendencies—can occur with or without conscious awareness (Both et al., 2008; 
Hoffmann, Janssen, & Turner, 2004; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998). The potential for 
unconscious processes to impact behavior further limits the reliability of utility functions 
based on explicitly stated preferences. Nonetheless, the principles of EDT remain useful for 
describing choices, even if driven by processes lacking awareness or intentionality. 
From a MEDO perspective, specific preferences—as well as associated beliefs and 
information processes—probabilistically influence which actions and reactions are likely to 
occur in various situations. To the extent that different goals constitute independent 
sources of value, they can be expressed as separate terms in a utility function describing 
overall motivation (Abbas, 2010; D. E. Bell, 1979; Gw, W, D, & M, 1995). With respect to our 
hungry agent, its independent valuations of apples and oranges could be expressed as 
separate terms in its utility function for food preferences. The relative weightings of these 
terms would specify the magnitudes of positive and negative expected utilities (i.e., reward 
and punishment expectations, respectively) associated with consuming these various foods. 
Moreover, since both expected rewards and punishments can contribute to differential 
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expected utilities (i.e., preferences), both potential increases and decreases in value can 
drive motivation and desire. 
However, since experiences shape expected utility, relative valuations are not static 
quantities. Expected utilities increase or decrease based on the number, intensity, and 
kinds of rewarding and punishing experiences. Hence, additional experience could further 
change valuations. With respect to the abstract utility function describing these 
preferences, corresponding terms would also increase or decrease to reflect these changing 
significances. For example, if reward expectations for oranges increase after encountering a 
particularly appetizing batch, then relative preferences for apples would necessarily 
decrease. Even with constant expectations for consummatory pleasure, enhanced desire for 
oranges would necessarily decrease the proportional expected contributions of apple 
selections to overall utility. Conversely, if particularly unappetizing experiences increase 
expected punishment from apples, then this revaluation of alternative choices would 
increase relative preferences for oranges. In either of these cases, preferring one option 
more entails preferring the other option less, and vice versa. Alternatively, apples and 
oranges could be especially delicious in combination, thereby increasing the positive 
expected utilities of both fruits without changing expected utilities relative to each other. 
Nonetheless, all preferences are necessarily relative as long as actions are constrained by 
limited resources. 
FEEDBACK DYNAMICS AND DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF PREFERENCES 
"Positive feedback loops are sources of growth, explosion, erosion, and collapse in systems. A 
system with an unchecked positive loop ultimately will destroy itself. That’s why there are so 
few of them. Usually a negative loop will kick in sooner or later.” 
–Donella Medows (1941-2001) 
By influencing action selection, changing valuations can shape behavior in ways that 
further alter preferences. To the extent that likelihoods for high-quality fruit selections can 
increase through practice, then reward expectations would also increase with picking skill. 
However, since likelihoods for obtaining this practice are influenced by the ability of 
expected rewards to bias action selection, this feedback loop could amplify reward 
expectations with time and experience. This sort of dynamic could also be supported by 
progressively decreasing punishment expectations, such as reducing likelihoods of 
selecting low-quality fruit or difficulties with orange peeling. Theoretically, a sufficient 
number of positive experiences could result in oranges being exclusively preferred, thereby 
eliminating the expected utility of apples. 
This example involved positive feedback, which refers to a process increasing as a result of 
its outputs. In this case, relative preferences drove action selection (i.e., the process) such 
that experienced utility further changed relative expected rewards (i.e., the outputs), 
thereby resulting in increasingly amplified differential expected utility. Negative feedback 
corresponds to the opposite situation of a process decreasing as a result of its outputs, such 
as would be the case if increased experiences with a kind of fruit resulted in boredom, 
thereby reducing expected rewards. Yet the resulting attenuation of expected utility would 
be self-limiting, as less frequent selections would reduce boredom. 
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Punishing experiences could influence relative preferences via negative feedback, since 
fruit with higher punishment expectations would be less likely to be selected. This process 
of increasing negative expected utility for punished fruit selections would also be self-
limiting. However, this bias could further contribute to the positive feedback dynamics of 
increasing relative preferences for non-punished fruit selections. Theoretically, intensely 
punishing early experiences with apples could result in an agent always choosing oranges, 
even if these initial apples were of unrepresentatively poor quality. In any of these cases, if 
an agent lacks motivation for choosing apples, then this relative devaluation would be 
perpetuated by self-sustaining patterns of goal-oriented behaviors. Alternatively, if apples 
and oranges were synergistically rewarding in combination, then rather than feedback 
amplification of initial differences in expected value, expected rewards for apples could 
increase as a consequence of increasing skill in orange selection, and vice versa. 
Thus, not only do neural representations for expected utilities compete and cooperate in 
influencing particular choices, but experience-driven expectations also allow this evolution 
to be extended over longer timescales through feedback dynamics. Differential feedback 
amplification of reward and punishment expectations could lead to action selection being 
dominated by one preference or another, thus resulting in increasing specialization and 
differentiation in a particular direction. It is also possible to have cooperative synergy among 
expectations, but all preferences have associated opportunity costs with respect to other 
potential dynamics of differential specialization (e.g. developing skill in picking or preparing 
other types of fruits). In this way, each preference competes and cooperates with every other 
preference in determining the future evolution of the overall system. 
GENERALIZED DARWINISM 
NATURAL SELECTION: REPLICATION, VARIATION, SELECTION 
“The generality of the principles of natural selection means that any entities in nature that 
have variation, reproduction, and heritability may evolve… This axiomatization makes clear 
that the principles can be applied equally to genes, organisms, populations, species, and at 
opposite ends of the scale, prebiotic molecules and ecosystems.” 
 –Richard Lewontin (1929-present) 
MEDO analyzes preferences as action selection biases, which influence the ability of various 
neural patterns to shape behavior. However, as with all other biological patterns, the 
neural representations underlying these preferences are also modeled as competing and 
cooperating in a Darwinian struggle for existence (Aldrich et al., 2008; Edelman, 1993; 
Edelman & Mountcastle, 1978; Hayek, 1952; McDowell, 2010; Seth & Baars, 2005; Wyckoff, 
1987).1 MEDO further considers selective processes to be implicit—and sometimes explicit—
preferences emerging from evolutionary systems. From this perspective, EDT can be used to 
characterize both the motivations of individual agents, as well as dynamics within 
                                                        
1 Neural Darwinism will be described in greater detail in the section “Phenotypic plasticity and the evolution 
of evolving nervous systems.” 
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evolutionary systems more generally. In this way, EDT provides a common language for 
modeling selection and preferences on multiple levels, including population genetics, 
cultures, and within individual nervous systems. 
MEDO utilizes evolution as a general principle for understanding the emergence of 
complexity within all dynamical systems capable of supporting replication, variation, and 
selection, regardless of specific details of mechanistic implementation (Aldrich et al., 2008; 
Campbell, 2009; R. Dawkins, 1983; Nelson, 2007). These three features are the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for natural selection to occur: 
 Replication: replicators are any patterns capable of reproducing aspects of 
themselves over time, and thus exhibiting some degree of heredity—broadly 
construed—in their ability to increase the likelihood that similar forms will persist 
into the future (i.e., evolutionary fitness). 
 Variation: variations are features that differ between replicators and influence 
relative evolutionary fitness (i.e., adaptive significance). 
 Selection: selective pressures are any factors capable of influencing adaptive 
significance. 
These principles are most frequently associated with biological species. More specifically, 
adaptive significance applies to the sum-total of biological features (i.e., phenotypes) within 
populations of organisms. Further, evolutionary fitness applies to the replicative success of 
heritable aspects of organisms (i.e., genes) contributing to these phenotypes. 
However, evolution is not limited to reproducing organisms and population genetics. 
Indeed, when Williams (1966) first suggested the gene-centered view of evolution, he 
defined a gene in probabilistic terms as “that which segregates and recombines with 
appreciable frequency” (Williams, 1966). Darwin (1859) himself proposed that the 
principles of natural selection could apply to the formation and transformations of 
languages over time, as well as competing customs among tribal groups (Aldrich et al., 
2008). In a similar vein, Dawkins (1976) suggested that aspects of cultural evolution can be 
understood in terms of “memes,” or units of information that compete and cooperate to 
perpetuate themselves within and between the minds of humans (Richard Dawkins, 
1976).2 Further, evolutionary history preceded the advent of DNA-based inheritance, 
beginning with self-perpetuating cycles of chemical reactions and possibly self-replicating 
RNA molecules (Takeuchi, Hogeweg, & Koonin, 2011; Takeuchi, Salazar, Poole, & Hogeweg, 
2008). Moreover, even self-modifying proteins and computer programs are capable of 
evolving by natural selection (Bawazer et al., 2012; Holland, 1992; Shorter, 2010; Von 
Neumann, 1966; Waters, 2011). Thus, Darwinian analysis can extend to a broad range of 
                                                        
2 Numerous criticisms have been levied against the meme of memes, ranging from the analogy being 
misleading on account of dissimilarities with genetic replicators, to the memetic evolution providing an 
inaccurately over-simplified account of cultural change (Atran, 2001; Boyd & Richerson, 2000; Fracchia & 
Lewontin, 2005).  
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phenomena, including the competition and cooperation of neural patterns within the minds 
of individual agents. 
NATURAL SELECTION, ADAPTATION, AND EVOLUTIONARY UTILITY 
“There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a contriver; order without 
choice; arrangement without anything capable of arranging; subservience and relation to a 
purpose without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing 
their office in accomplishing that end without ever having been contemplated or the means 
accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subservience of means to an end, 
relation of instruments to a use imply the presence of intelligence and mind.” 
 –William Paley (1743-1805) 
 
"Adaptation and function are two aspects of one problem." 
–Julian Huxley (1887-1975) 
Most simply, natural selection can be viewed as an elaboration of a seemingly tautological 
maxim: patterns that replicate best tend to replicate most. That is, if heritable variations are 
more effective at increasing replicative success, then they are more likely to predominate 
within a system. However, when selected change is able to accumulate over geological 
timescales—as with genetic heredity—this simple heuristic explains how intricately 
functioning biological systems can arise from “blind” processes lacking conscious foresight 
or intentionality (Richard Dawkins, 1996a, 1997; Dennett, 1996, 2009). Thus, evolution 
creates a kind of illusory goal-directedness, in that resulting forms appear to be 
intentionally designed (i.e., engineered) in their usefully specialized complexity (i.e., 
adaptations). However, these complex functional specializations emerge from the simple 
fact that some patterns are more effective at replicating than others. In this way, evolution 
allows for “design without a designer” (Ayala, 2007), and adaptations can be understood as 
partially optimized solutions for engineering problems (Dennett, 1996). 
For example, if apples and oranges were plentiful in an environment with scarce nutrition, 
then organisms would be more likely to survive and reproduce if they were better suited 
for achieving sustenance from these foods. That is, to obtain nutrients from these sources, 
various characteristics of different organisms would make them more or less effective at 
acquiring fruits, identifying particularly edible specimens, extracting the most palatable 
parts, etc. Each of these challenges would constitute selective pressures in that an 
organism’s ability to perform these functions would influence its ability to reproduce (i.e., 
evolutionary fitness). To the extent that these features were heritable, with subsequent 
generations, their prevalence in the overall population would increase as a result of their 
positive adaptive significance. On sufficiently extended timescales, the average member of 
that species—or sub-species—could eventually acquire complex functional specializations 
(i.e., adaptations) for effectively achieving sustenance from apples and oranges. 
In this way, selective pressures emerge from interactions between organisms and 
frequently encountered environments, also known as ecological niches (Begon, Harper, & 
Townsend, 1999). More specifically, the relationships between organisms and their niches 
are primary determinants of selection, since these interactions influence the survival and 
 
12 
reproductive consequences of various adaptations. Over time, species tend to become 
increasingly well adapted to their respective niches, since these environmental conditions 
influence which organisms produce more descendants. However, through their functioning, 
organisms are also capable of altering environments in a process known as niche 
construction (Day, Laland, & Odling-Smee, 2003; K N Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 
1999; Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003). This bidirectional flow of information 
between organisms and their environments occurs on the level of individuals, groups, and 
even entire species. Over time, these interactions are capable of radically changing 
environmental conditions, thereby altering the selective pressures that initially shaped 
them. 
There are numerous ways in which niche construction could impact our population of 
evolving fruit eaters. For instance, a coalition of individuals could focus on a particular 
expanse of trees and collectively defend it against other organisms. In this case, the fitness 
of these individuals would be primarily determined by their functioning within this 
territory, as well as by their interactions with other group members. Additionally, if these 
organisms learned how to select apples and oranges with optimal nutritional properties, 
then the seeds of those particular fruits could be dispersed and fertilized with greater 
frequency. Over time, this could lead to a greater proportion of trees producing highly 
nutritious apples and oranges, which in turn could lead to those fruits producing increasing 
reward expectancies in the animals that consume them. 
Theoretically, an initial discrepancy in the preferences of fruit consuming—and seed 
distributing—organisms could result in differential feedback amplification of co-evolving 
species being greater for one variety of fruit compared with another. If this situation 
resulted in an environment dominated by orange trees, then this cooperative evolution 
would come at the expense of organisms that were adapted to apple trees as their primary 
niche. Alternatively, if apple-dependent organisms were necessary for maintaining 
ecosystem stability, then differential feedback amplification could be self-limiting via a 
negative feedback relationship between orange dominated environments and the 
conditions supporting this proliferation. 
Thus, context-dependent changes in adaptive significances allow natural selection and 
niche construction to be functionally interrelated through processes of reciprocal causation 
(i.e., bidirectional causation or circular causation), thereby potentially enabling both 
enhancement and inhibition of specialization and differentiation in populations of 
organisms. Notably, reciprocally causal relationships also characterize our previously 
described example, wherein experience-dependent changes in expected utilities allowed 
preference-based action selection and practice-based skill learning to have bidirectional 
influences with each other. Although one case describes goal-oriented behavior, and the 
other purposeless optimization, both scenarios involve self-modifying evolution determined 
by various positive and negative feedback processes on multiple levels. Additionally, in both 
cases, the balance between these feedback dynamics largely depends on happenstance, in 
that defining contingencies could be influenced by chance events such as idiosyncratic 
historical circumstances (P Bak & Paczuski, 1995; Per Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987; 
Lovecchio, Allegrini, Geneston, West, & Grigolini, 2012). 
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While discussing the lack of ultimate purpose in evolution, Dawkins (1996) proposed that 
natural selection can be expressed in terms of an evolutionary “utility function” in which 
value solely depends upon genetic proliferation (Richard Dawkins, 1996b). Even if 
adaptations result from illusory goal-directedness, this analogy appropriately uses the 
language of EDT. Functionality entails relative optimality, and hence utility. However, the 
rationality of mindless evolution is bounded in that changes can only be made through 
incremental modifications of existing adaptations, rather than explicitly planned designs. 
Since evolution cannot be informed by expectations of future environmental changes, 
neither the processes involved nor outcomes produced are guaranteed to be optimal in any 
sense. 
For example, our fruit-eating organisms could theoretically extract more nutrients if they 
were capable of metabolizing entire oranges. However, even if this functionality could be 
achieved with a simple enzyme for digesting peels, requisite adaptive variations may have 
never arisen over the evolutionary history of that species. Or, at one point in time, there 
may have been organisms capable of digesting peels, but selective pressures may have 
been insufficiently powerful to reliably increase the prevalence of those adaptations. In 
natural selection, particular forms come to predominate because they were better than 
alternatives under the conditions in which they were selected, also known as the environment 
of evolutionary adaptation (Foley, 1995; Segal & MacDonald, 1998; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990). However, better in no way implies that particular adaptations are the best 
conceivable solutions for their respective functions (Richard Dawkins, 1997; Wright, 
1982). 
NATURAL SELECTION, ADAPTIVE SIGNIFICANCE, AND EVOLVING SELECTIVE PRESSURES 
"Since the phenotype as a whole is the target of selection, it is impossible to improve 
simultaneously all aspects of the phenotype to the same degree." 
–Ernst Mayr (1904-2005) 
MEDO applies EDT to all evolutionary systems, even if they lack explicit goals or beliefs 
required for intentional behavior. Although only agents have subjective experiences, non-
agent systems can still be considered to have implicit preferences in that certain outcomes 
(i.e., variations) are favored over others. That is, as replicators compete and cooperate in 
attempting to perpetuate themselves with limited resources, variations are differentially 
selected to the extent that they effectively satisfy fitness criteria (Richard Dawkins, 1997; 
Wright, 1932). Or more precisely, environments do not actively select particular forms, but 
the most effective replicators will tend to predominate within the systems in which they 
perpetuate themselves. Nonetheless, selective pressures can be viewed as terms in an 
abstract utility function for evolutionary fitness: just as the varying preferences of agents 
compete and cooperate in influencing choices, every selective pressure competes and 
cooperates with every other selective pressure in influencing adaptive significance.  
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Mindless selective processes are incapable of conducting expected value analyses to 
maximize their implicit preferences.3 However, this sort of computation is automatically 
carried out by the numerous and varied interactions of organisms with their environments, 
given sufficiently large populations. These interactions—and their resulting impacts on 
differential replication—implement a kind of sampling process that incorporates both 
adaptive significances of outcomes as well as probabilities for their occurrences in 
environments of evolutionary adaptation. This process may lack intentionality or beliefs, 
yet to the extent that the future resembles the past, prior evolutionary outcomes can function 
analogously to accurate reward and punishment expectancies for the motivated behavior of 
individual agents. To the extent that selective pressures change over time, then differential 
survival and reproduction may eventually alter population characteristics in a way that 
reflects these changing adaptive significances. That is, novel selective pressures can update 
evolutionary outcomes, given that the population survives. Alternatively, entire classes of 
organisms can go extinct, as has been the case for the vast majority of species throughout 
evolutionary history. 
To return to our example of evolving fruit preferences, if apples and oranges had 
synergistic nutritional properties when combined, then selection could increase for 
adaptations relating to both foods. However, if fitness depended upon oranges more than 
apples in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, then it can also be expected that 
organisms would become particularly well suited to obtaining nutrition from oranges, 
relative to apples. With respect to the implicit utility function describing these selective 
pressures, terms corresponding to the adaptive significances of orange-related 
specializations would be more heavily weighted, relative to terms describing apple-related 
specializations. 
Theoretically, the average organism within the population could become so thoroughly 
adapted to eating oranges that adaptive significance lessened for apple-related 
specializations. This scenario would be especially likely if functional tradeoffs were 
required in optimizing animals for unique properties differing between apples and oranges. 
For example, if more minerals were deposited into strong jaws for consuming apples, then 
fewer minerals might be available to strengthen fingers for peeling oranges. Over time, 
declining selective pressures could result in a situation where apple-related specializations 
deteriorate to the point of non-functionality (i.e., vestigiality), thus completely eliminating 
contributions from apple-related adaptations to evolutionary fitness. Apple-specific 
nutrients could become essential for survival in future environments, but the population 
would be unable to respond to these challenges if it no longer contained sufficient 
adaptations for consuming apples. In this scenario, the bounded rationality of evolution 
                                                        
3 Although evolution does not use expected value analyses to determine preferences, neither do most 
humans. The complexity of potential consequences produces a combinatorial explosion, necessitating 
sampling in exploring these probability spaces. However, unlike blind natural selection, human minds can use 
causal models of future events to restrict searches. Nonetheless, since modeled futures are influenced by the 
limitations of past experience, even conscious beings can be impeded in maximizing value if they become 
fixated on suboptimal solutions. 
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might result in extinction. However, if apple-related adaptations remained in a subset of 
organisms, then changing selective pressures could result in those features spreading 
throughout the population. Additionally, functional tradeoffs might result in organisms 
becoming decreasingly effective at obtaining sustenance from oranges, depending on the 
specific feedback dynamics involved. 
As this thought experiment reveals, in addition to selective pressures competing and 
cooperating in shaping dynamics, evolutionary outcomes also compete and cooperate 
through their relative contributions to overall fitness. Just as with agent choices, 
differential feedback amplification can produce specialization and differentiation within 
evolutionary systems. For agents, past expected utilities influence present outcomes, which 
in turn contribute to current preferences that influence present and future expected 
utilities. For evolutionary systems, past selective pressures influence present outcomes, 
which in turn contribute to current selective pressures that influence present and future 
adaptive significances. Although these feedback dynamics involve conscious agents in one 
instance and unconscious optimization processes in the other, MEDO uses common 
formalisms to analyze underlying processes. 
OPTIMIZATION ON MULTIPLE LEVELS 
MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS AND EVOLUTIONARY ENGINEERING 
ANALYSES 
"It is a profound truth that Nature does not know best; that genetical evolution... is a story of 
waste, makeshift, compromise and blunder." 
–Peter Medawar (1915-1987) 
Although adaptations result from blind optimization processes, the complex functional 
specializations of biological systems can nonetheless be analyzed with the same principles 
used for engineering decisions (Lewis et al., 2006). Indeed, the dynamics underlying 
evolutionary adaptation have similar formal properties to those found in multi-objective 
optimization problems (Coello et al., 2009; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Sawaragi, Nakayama, & 
Tanino, 1985). That is, each attribute of a design represents a separate source of expected 
utility in contributing to overall value. 
More specifically, in choosing between various design configurations, engineers decide 
which functional tradeoffs (e.g. optimizing for affordability or reliability) and functional 
synergies (e.g. optimizing for reliability and durability) will be preferred in attempting to 
maximize the overall utility of their creations. Just as the neural representations for 
expected utilities compete and cooperate in shaping action selection, engineering always 
involves attempting to satisfy multiple objectives with minimal compromises—even when 
this “engineering” is carried out by purposeless natural selection (e.g. optimizing 
organisms for reproductive capacity or robustness (Pianka, 1970; Reznick, Bryant, & 
Bashey, 2002)). Thus, the principles of EDT can be logically extended to all optimization 
processes, whether goal-directedness is illusory or actual. 
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In the same way that observed behavior can be used to estimate relative preferences, by 
viewing the functional properties of designs as choices (i.e., revealed preferences), it is 
possible to estimate sources of utility influencing optimal solutions. For example, if a 
product automatically peels oranges, then it could reasonably be inferred that the engineer 
preferred for the device to have this functionality. It could be additionally inferred that this 
feature was expected to either directly provide value for the designer—who may have had 
a particular fondness for eating oranges or a particular aversion to peeling them—or 
indirectly by providing value to potential customers. If the machine incompletely peels the 
oranges it encounters, then it could also be inferred that this outcome was desired. Perhaps 
there was a functional tradeoff where complete peeling could only be achieved by greatly 
extending operating times, which would have been frustrating for both the designer and 
purchasers. Or, creating a more thorough peeler could have increased costs to a point 
where the device was prohibitively expensive for potential customers. In either of these 
two cases, design characteristics would reflect the competing and cooperating sources of 
expected utilities motivating engineering decisions. 
However, just as utility functions inferred from agent choices have limited reliability, 
similar limitations apply when attempting to infer relative expected utilities from 
engineered designs. In other words, all agents make suboptimal decisions, including 
engineers. With respect to the aforementioned ineffective orange peeler, the designer may 
have had a personal preference for orange rinds, and incorrectly assumed that the majority 
of consumers feel similarly. If this inaccurate belief resulted in reduced sales—and if sales 
were valued—then bounded rationality lead to actions whose outcomes did not maximize 
utility. Or, the engineer may have desired a thorough orange peeler, but lacked the 
capability to design such a product. In either of these two cases, some of the engineer’s 
relative preferences would be incorrectly inferred from design characteristics. 
Nonetheless, just as agents differ in their degrees of rationality, engineers differ in their 
abilities to design systems according to their desires. The greater the skill of an engineer, 
the more likely it is that design characteristics will represent intentional choices, thereby 
reflecting the utility function of the optimizer. If an engineering genius made a product that 
consistently under-peels oranges by a slight amount, then that particular outcome is likely 
to be precisely what maximized overall utility. That is, the outcome maximized value given 
the necessary constraints of functional tradeoffs and synergies, which determine the 
competitive and cooperative relationships between various preferences. Assuming a high 
degree of skill and accurate beliefs regarding action-outcome associations, relative 
strengths of preferences can be expected to proportionally drive specific design choices for a 
rational engineer. 
In light of the fact that evolution always involves multiple selective pressures, similar 
considerations apply to the emergent designs of natural selection. Just as the skill of an 
engineer determines the degree to which preferences can be inferred from design 
characteristics, the power of an evolutionary optimization process determines the degree 
to which selective pressures can be inferred from impacted phenomena. Thus, viewing 
evolutionary outcomes (i.e., adaptations and their frequencies within populations) as 
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signifying past selective pressures is comparable to viewing the outcomes of agent choices as 
revealed preferences. 
However, if the power of natural selection is compromised by historical circumstance or 
chance events (Eldredge & Gould, 1972; Gould, 1990), then empirically derived selective 
pressures will inaccurately model past fitness criteria to the extent that they do not account 
for these factors. Although such considerations limit the ability of biologists to infer 
adaptive significances, attempts to more accurately model evolution are still grounded in 
an engineering perspective as a kind of default null-hypothesis (Gould, 1992). That is, even 
when theories emphasize the bounds of evolutionary optimization, these models are still 
expressed in terms of deviations from optimal fitness maximization (Gould & Lewontin, 
1979). 
EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION AND FITNESS LANDSCAPES 
“In the theory with which we have to deal, Absolute Ignorance is the artificer; so that we may 
enunciate as the fundamental principle of the whole system, that, in order to make a perfect 
and beautiful machine, it is not requisite to know how to make it. This proposition will be 
found, on careful examination, to express, in condensed form, the essential purport of the 
Theory, and to express in a few words all Mr. Darwin's meaning; who, by a strange inversion 
of reasoning, seems to think Absolute Ignorance fully qualified to take the place of Absolute 
Wisdom in all of the achievements of creative skill.” 
– Robert Mackenzie Beverley (1798-1868) 
 
“Everyone by now presumably knows about the danger of premature optimization. I think we 
should be just as worried about premature design - designing too early what a program 
should do.” 
 –Paul Graham (1964-present) 
Evolutionary computation combines aspects of intentional and unintentional design in ways 
that illustrate key principles of the MEDO framework (Coello et al., 2009; Keeney & Raiffa, 
1993; Sawaragi et al., 1985). With this approach to optimization, methodologies such as 
genetic algorithms are commonly used to solve multi-objective problems for which design 
considerations are too complicated for intentional engineering.4 However, with these 
techniques, engineers can indirectly maximize utility by defining selection criteria (i.e., 
fitness functions) for programs that evaluate various design configurations. These 
algorithms search through large numbers of feature permutations—requiring super-
computing to run these simulations—and probabilistically choose the subset of designs 
that best meet pre-specified selection criteria, thereby maximizing their fitness functions. 
Alterations are introduced in the process of replicating successful configurations, thus 
creating variations in the next generation of designs from which further selection occurs. 
                                                        
4 Although evolutionary computation is a broad discipline involving many techniques, we will focus on 
genetic algorithms because of their conceptual similarities with core principles of biological natural selection. 
Also, we will only discuss a subset of the many different ways that genetic algorithms are utilized to solve 
optimization problems. 
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With subsequent iterations, increasingly well-adapted solutions can be discovered for 
complex engineering problems. 
For example, an engineer may desire to create affordable, reliable, quick, neat, and 
thorough orange peelers, but is unable to determine which combination of features and 
materials would be most likely to maximize sales while minimizing production costs. 
Theoretically, our aspiring entrepreneur could use genetic algorithms to attempt to solve 
this problem, given that sufficient funds are available to pay a programmer and obtain 
processing time on a super-computing cluster. Rather than designing the product directly, 
the programmer would design the simulation environment and algorithms, and the 
engineer could specify selection criteria that maximize profits while incorporating these 
various considerations, including functional tradeoffs and synergies. 
If skillfully implemented, genetic algorithms produce increasingly optimized solutions with 
successive generations. However, just as with biological evolution, these programs are not 
guaranteed to converge upon optimal solutions. Proposals will be better than alternatives, 
but not necessarily best overall. In our example, the algorithm could select increasingly 
useful and profitable designs over time, yet they could all be inferior to the engineer’s 
initial orange peelers. Additionally, it is a non-trivial challenge to choose fitness functions 
that select design configurations with high utility (e.g. overall profits). That is, the fitness 
function of an algorithm may not correspond to the utility function of the engineer. This 
may be due to the fact that the programmer is unable to create a simulation environment 
that adequately models design challenges, or selects configurations in ways that 
inaccurately represent engineering preferences. Alternatively, the principle of “garbage in, 
garbage out” could apply if specific preferences would be unlikely to generate utility if 
realized outside of computer simulations. In this case, the bounded rationality of the 
engineer—rather than the programmer—would be responsible for suboptimal choices. 
The efficacy of genetic algorithms can be visualized using fitness landscapes, where base 
dimensions are defined by various features, and graph-heights represent evaluations of 
fitness functions with different combinations of feature specifications (Richter, 2010). This 
conceptual approach was first proposed for evaluating the evolutionary fitness of various 
genotypes and phenotypes, where similar configurations are located closer to each other 
on landscapes, relative to dissimilar configurations (Richard Dawkins, 1997; A. J. Eckert & 
Dyer, 2012; Misevic, Kouyos, & Bonhoeffer, 2009; Wright, 1932). For genetic algorithms, a 
given set of designs can be represented as distributed points on a landscape, with better 
solutions located higher on the graph, relative to worse solutions. When random variations 
are applied to previous configurations with greatest fitness, some of these configurations 
will increase optimality, and some will decrease optimality. That is, random lateral shifts on 
a fitness landscape will cause solutions to move to higher elevations, and some to move to 
lower elevations. If the algorithm is more likely to select configurations with greater 
fitness, then populations of candidate solutions will climb to higher elevations with 
successive generations, such that the average design configuration is increasingly likely to 
be distributed near fitness peaks. 
The overall efficacy of genetic algorithms can be conceptualized as the reliability and speed 
with which proposed solutions reach landscape peaks (i.e., maxima), corresponding to 
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locally optimal solutions. However, since solutions with lower elevations are less likely to 
be selected, genetic algorithms can become trapped at local optima and fail to reach 
globally optimal solutions during the time allotted for simulation. More specifically, 
variability is typically introduced into these programs as minor alterations, corresponding 
to small lateral shifts on a fitness landscape. This search strategy is justified based on the 
notion that a series of small shifts is more likely to result in progressive movement to 
higher elevations, relative to large shifts that may move a design configuration away from 
peaks. However, if relatively optimal candidate designs are located on local optima, they 
are unlikely to move to other peaks if it requires a series of moves to lower elevations. 
Configurations closer to the local maxima may be created in any given generation, but if 
these shifts involve moving to lower elevations, they are less likely to be selected for the 
next generation. In this way, the majority of candidate solutions are likely to return back to 
local maxima with subsequent generations. 
Genetic algorithms can be modified to become more effective at maximizing overall fitness. 
Yet, this usually depends on a conscious engineer-programmer who evaluates outcomes 
and explicitly decides to change fitness parameters (Smit & Eiben, 2009). In our example, 
the engineer and programmer could attempt to simplify the problem by removing 
operating-time as a consideration, thereby reducing the number of objectives that need to be 
optimized. Alternatively, they could decide to prioritize neatness or thoroughness to 
greater or lesser degrees—thus, changing weighting coefficients of different objectives in the 
fitness function—depending on the extent to which these various alterations produce 
desirable outcomes. In terms of fitness landscapes, either of these strategies could reduce 
the variability of the landscape, thereby potentially increasing the likelihood that algorithms 
reach global optima. 
INTENTIONALITY AND EVOLVING UTILITY LANDSCAPES 
“Probably the first clear insight into the deep nature of control… was that it is not about 
pulling levers to produce intended and inexorable results. This notion of control applies only 
to trivial machines. It never applies to a total system that includes any kind of probabilistic 
element—from the weather, to people; from markets, to the political economy. No: the 
characteristic of a non-trivial system that is under control, is that despite dealing with 
variables too many to count, too uncertain to express, and too difficult even to understand, 
something can be done to generate a predictable goal.” 
            –Anthony Stafford Beer (1926-2002) 
Optimality notwithstanding, by specifying fitness functions for genetic algorithms, 
conscious agents can potentially maximize value from processes lacking foresight or 
intentionality. Similarly, MEDO stipulates that genes maximized replicative success by 
influencing—with limited specificity and bounded rationality—fitness criteria for 
evolutionary optimization within the nervous systems of individual organisms. Yet, in this 
case, a blind optimization process eventually gave rise to something new in the history of 
evolution: self-aware minds in which explicit models could intentionally drive goal-
oriented behavior. Even without self-awareness, the utility functions of biological agents 
continuously change with experience in ways that increase the efficacy with which they 
achieve valued outcomes (i.e., operant conditioning). Similarly to how engineers could 
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update fitness functions to increase the efficacy of genetic algorithms, agents can update 
their preferences to increase their ability to maximize overall utility. 
However, the manner in which engineers indirectly maximize utility by altering computer 
algorithms is more closely paralleled by the manner in which genes indirectly maximize 
fitness by shaping the development of nervous systems. More specifically, while genes can 
only determine adaptive significance from post hoc consequences, self-aware agents can 
continuously alter their particular expectations and preferences based on moment-to-
moment estimations of dynamics. That is, explicit models allow organisms to more precisely 
anticipate the consequences of their choices in novel situations before acting upon them. 
This increased predictive power allows organisms to more effectively function within their 
various niches and discover fitness maxima. However, this flexibility also allows individual 
utility functions to deviate from the fitness functions of genetic replicators. Hence, it can be 
difficult to determine the extent to which a behavior has been shaped by evolving 
populations of genes, experience, or both. 
Since neural replicators exist within embodied systems, embedded within external 
environments, neural evolution exhibits the reciprocal functional relations characteristic of 
the interplay between genetic natural selection and niche construction. However, the far 
greater rate of neural evolution amplifies the inherent non-linearity of systems governed 
by reciprocal causality. In this way, utility maximizing dynamics may be more accurately 
described with evolving utility generative models that update themselves on the basis of 
experience. These theoretical generative models would specify probabilistic utility 
landscapes, defining the expected utilities of various action-outcome associations, as well as 
the adaptive significances for underlying patterns (i.e., neural replicators). That is, neural 
patterns are more likely to replicate their forms if they contribute to outcomes with higher 
expected utilities. These utility landscapes are probabilistic because expectations are based 
on inferences—both explicit and implicit—that influence which patterns are likely to 
predominate within the nervous system, thereby shaping action selection. Since different 
actions contribute to different experiences, which shape further action-influencing 
inferences, this process of reciprocal causation allows for self-directed evolutionary 
dynamics. 
The process of estimating utility generative models is as complicated and difficult as it 
sounds, and in more rarified forms this ability seems to be a uniquely human capacity 
known as “theory of mind” (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; K. 
Markram & Markram, 2010). In order to truly understand an agent’s actions, it is necessary 
to understand its system of beliefs and desires, which are latent variables to which we have 
relatively incomplete access. Further, the limited complexity and precision with which we 
are able to model these variables further restricts our ability to predict behavior. Moreover, 
although introspection provides us with a rich assortment of memories, fantasies, and 
feelings, we remain mysterious even to ourselves in countless respects. Indeed, people are 
notoriously inaccurate in predicting their future desires via “affective forecasting” (Gilbert, 
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2006). And these complications become even more challenging in the context of social 
interactions (Faratin, Klein, Sayama, & Bar-Yam, 2002).5 
In describing how genetic evolution produced organisms with nervous systems that 
support further evolutionary processes, MEDO provides an overarching framework for 
understanding the development of goal-oriented behavior. Selective processes are 
analyzed on all levels capable of influencing outcomes, the unique replicative dynamics 
within each level, as well as interactions between levels. However, in order to predict the 
relative likelihoods of particular outcomes emerging from these dynamics, it is necessary to 
be precise in specifying the sources of utility that drive these systems. 
GENERALIZED DARWINISM AND EDT: SELECTIVE PRESSURES AS PREFERENCES; 
PREFERENCES AS SELECTIVE PRESSURES 
"Suppose nothing else were 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions, and we 
could not get down, or up, to any other 'reality' besides the reality of our drives - for thinking 
is merely a relations of these drives to each other; is it not permitted to make the experiment 
and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be sufficient for also understanding on 
the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or 'material') world?” 
–Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
In light of the phenomena we have considered, MEDO identifies the following 
correspondences when characterizing evolutionary systems in terms of generalized 
Darwinism and the minds of individual agents in terms of EDT: 
1. The expected changes in overall fitness from particular evolutionary outcomes (i.e., 
adaptive significances) correspond to expected changes in overall value from 
particular action-outcome associations (i.e., expected utilities). That is, adaptive 
significances in evolutionary systems are comparable to expected utilities in the minds 
of individual agents. 
2. Differential adaptive significances (i.e., selective pressures) correspond to 
differential expected utilities (i.e., preferences). That is, selective pressures in 
evolutionary systems are comparable to preferences in the minds of individual agents, 
the relative strengths of which influence likelihoods for various outcomes. 
3. The strengths of relative selective pressures (i.e., fitness functions) correspond to 
the strengths of relative valuations (i.e., utility functions). That is, fitness functions 
characterizing differential selection within evolutionary systems are comparable to 
utility functions characterizing differential valuation within the minds of individual 
agents. 
4. Fitness functions estimated from observed adaptations and their relative 
frequencies (i.e., inferred selective pressures) correspond to utility functions 
                                                        
5 As will be described later, social intelligence may have been the primary selective pressure for the increased 
nervous system complexity that would eventually give rise to culture. We will also describe how cultural 
evolution enhances the power of optimizing neural systems, thereby enabling further dynamics that must be 
included in any evolutionary analysis of human psychology. 
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estimated from observed choices (i.e., revealed preferences). That is, the process of 
inferring selective pressures from evolutionary outcomes is comparable to the process 
of inferring preferences from individual choices. 
5. The magnitudes of positive and negative adaptive significances (i.e., average 
increases and decreases in overall fitness, respectively) correspond to the 
magnitudes of positive and negative expected utilities (i.e., reward and punishment 
expectations, respectively). That is, average fitness changes in evolutionary systems 
are comparable to expected utility changes for individual agents, both of which can 
potentially shape future selection in circularly causal feedback processes. 
6. Graphical representations of fitness function values with various feature 
permutations (i.e., fitness landscapes) correspond to graphical representations of 
utility function values with various outcome permutations (i.e., utility landscapes). 
That is, fitness landscapes defining adaptive significances within evolutionary systems 
are comparable to utility landscapes defining expected utilities within the minds of 
individual agents. 
7. Peaks in fitness landscapes (i.e., evolutionary outcomes with maximum adaptive 
significances) correspond to peaks in utility landscapes (i.e., action-outcome 
associations with maximum expected utilities). That is, selecting evolutionary 
outcomes that maximize fitness is comparable to choosing actions where outcomes are 
expected to maximize utility. 
8. The speed and reliability with which evolutionary optimization processes discover 
fitness maxima (i.e., algorithmic efficiency) correspond to the speed and reliability 
with which minds discover utility maxima (i.e., effective intelligence). That is, the 
relative efficiencies of various evolutionary algorithms are comparable to the relative 
effective intelligences of various minds. 
9. Failures of evolutionary systems to maximize fitness in shaping outcomes (i.e., non-
intentionality and blind optimization) correspond to failures of agents to maximize 
utility through choices (i.e., unconscious dynamics and bounded rationality). That is, 
non-intentionality and blind optimization in evolutionary systems are comparable to 
unconscious dynamics and bounded rationality in the minds of individual agents. 
In analyzing the neural bases of goal-oriented behavior, we will demonstrate that it is more 
than a fortuitous coincidence that so many parallels can be found between generalized 
Darwinism and EDT. Rather than mere happenstance, these correspondences exist because 
minds are evolutionary systems and preferences function as selective pressures with 
respect to the neural patterns they influence. Further, since evolution’s ability to produce 
design without a designer can be conceptualized as optimization without an intentional 
optimizer, the process of natural selection can similarly be conceptualized as choice without 
a chooser. Moreover, these pseudo-choices further imply that evolutionary systems allow 
for reward without an experiencer, and even expectancy without a reasoner. 
RESOLVING THE FREE WILL PROBLEM USING MEDO: EMERGENCE, EVOLUTIONARY 
EXPLANATIONS, AND CAUSATION ON ULTIMATE AND PROXIMATE LEVELS 
“Autonomous man serves to explain only the things we are not yet able to explain in other 
ways. His existence depends upon our ignorance, and he naturally loses status as we come to 
know more about behavior. The task of a scientific analysis is to explain how the behavior of a 
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person as a physical system is related to the conditions under which the human species 
evolved and the conditions under which the individual lives.” 
–B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) 
 
"‘Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he’s unwilling to be 
seen with her in public.’ Today the mistress has become a lawfully wedded wife. Biologists no 
longer feel obligated to apologize for their use of teleological language; they flaunt it. The 
only concession which they make to its disreputable past is to rename it ‘teleonomy’." 
–David Hull (1935-2010) 
Although EDT and generalized Darwinism share many correspondences, they also exhibit a 
fundamental difference with respect to intentionality. More specifically, agent choices can 
be governed by conscious purposes (i.e., teleology), while natural selection can only 
produce illusory goal-directedness (i.e., teleonomy). In this way, all minds are evolutionary 
systems, but not all evolutionary systems are minds. However, replicative dynamics drive 
both mental and evolutionary systems. If mental states result from the functioning of 
neural patterns, then it could be argued that goal-directed causation is always illusory, 
whether applied to selective pressures or individual preferences. 
MEDO rejects this sort of analysis, as it fails to model phenomena where reciprocal 
causation gives rise to emergent properties with new causal significances (Dennett, 2003; 
Hofstadter, 1979; E. Thompson, 2006). That is, system-wide properties are influenced by 
synergistic interactions among constituents, but these interactions are also influenced by 
system-wide properties. This functional interdependence means that wholes and parts are 
inseparable, since the causal significances of parts have bidirectional relationships with 
their systemic organization into wholes. Although functional properties of mental and 
evolutionary systems both emerge from replicative dynamics, these causal analyses do not 
refute the significances of higher-level properties.6 Indeed, complex systems are best 
understood by considering multiple levels of analysis, as well as the particular 
correspondences between these levels. 
With respect to characterizing biological phenomena, Tinbergen (1963) distinguished 
between four types of explanations (Tinbergen, 1963): 1) mechanism explains how 
particular forms result in specific functional properties; 2) adaptation explains how specific 
functional properties (i.e., mechanisms) influence fitness; 3) ontogeny explains how 
developmental processes result in systems having particular forms with specific causal 
properties (i.e., adaptations); 4) and phylogeny explains how specific selective pressures 
changed the frequencies of particular developmental processes (i.e., ontogenies). 
These four types of explanations can be clearly identified in our previous thought 
experiment with evolving populations of fruit-eating organisms: 1) mechanism corresponds 
to the physiological and behavioral characteristics related to obtaining nutrition from 
                                                        
6 The mind can no more (and no less) be reduced to neural patterns than a hurricane to a collection of water 
droplets. 
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various fruits (e.g. strong jaw bones for chewing apples, or strong finger bones for peeling 
oranges); 2) adaptation corresponds to viewing these fruit-related specializations in terms 
of their fitness consequences (e.g. obtaining nutrition for survival and reproduction); 3) 
ontogeny corresponds to the developmental processes that gave rise to these 
specializations (e.g. relative strengthening of finger or jaw bones through mineral 
deposition); 4) and phylogeny corresponds to the history of selection through which 
particular developmental and mechanistic properties either increased or decreased in 
prevalence (e.g. differential replication of organisms with strong fingers and relatively 
weak jaws).  
Tinbergen further divided biological explanations into ultimate causes and proximate 
causes, both of which are valid on different levels of analysis. The proximate level is 
concerned with “how questions” and includes both mechanism and ontogeny (e.g. the 
functioning and development of specific physiological processes that allow organisms to 
obtain nutrition from various fruits). The ultimate level, in contrast, is concerned with “why 
questions” and includes both adaptations and phylogeny (e.g. oranges being more valuable 
nutrition sources than apples in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, leading to 
differential specializations). However, these two levels interact in that proximate 
ontogenies and resulting mechanisms are the consequence of adaptations being selected 
over the course of phylogeny. Further, the adaptive significance of proximate mechanism 
influences subsequent evolution, thus influencing ultimate level processes that shape the 
prevalence of future adaptations (e.g. niche construction whereby fruit eaters co-evolve 
with fruit-producing trees). Thus, phylogeny is the selection of ontogenies that create 
mechanisms whose adaptive significance shapes future phylogeny. 
In this way, selective pressures are ultimate-level descriptions of causes that lead to 
proximate-level developmental processes and their resulting mechanisms (Richard 
Dawkins, 1996b; Galef, 2009; Geisler & Diehl, 2002). Similarly, with respect to individual 
agents, preferences can be viewed as ultimate-level causes that select for the development of 
proximate-level choices (e.g. choosing oranges because of their higher expected utility, 
relative to apples). Further, these proximate-level choices can be viewed as ultimate-level 
causes that select for the proliferation of neural patterns, whose interactions create 
proximate level causes for the realization of particular action sequences (e.g. the desire to eat 
a particular orange resulting in an intricate series of muscle movements to remove the 
peel).7 
In addition to personal motivation, a further set of ultimate-level causes can be identified in 
the ways that natural selection shaped behavioral tendencies over evolutionary history. 
However, as a blind optimization process, selective pressures apply to the consequences of 
actions, rather than specific behaviors (Richard Dawkins, 1996a; Dennett, 1996, 2009). As 
a result, fitness can be maximized by a variety of proximate-level mechanisms, for which 
genetic involvement may be highly indirect. Indeed, although behavioral consequences may 
                                                        
7 The manner by which intentions are translated into actions will be discussed in greater detail in the section, 
“Cortical control systems.” 
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increase fitness for replicators that cause those behaviors on ultimate and proximate 
levels—genes and neural patterns, respectively—the subjective goals of individual 
organisms may have little resemblance to the adaptive significances to which they 
correspond (e.g. desiring oranges for pleasurable eating experiences, rather than their 
nutritional importance in the environment of evolutionary adaptation). 
In order to better understand these multi-level causes, in the following sections we will 
describe the evolutionary developmental origins of nervous systems, the ways that they are 
impacted by genetic and cultural replicators, and the similarities and differences between 
these various selective processes. Then after discussing the mechanisms by which neural 
evolution produces intentional actions, we will be able to more precisely evaluate the 
conditions that enable autonomous behavior. 
MULTILEVEL SELECTION: EVOLUTION, DEVELOPMENT, LEARNING  
EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 
UNITS OF SELECTION: GENE-CENTERED AND ORGANISMIC VIEWS OF EVOLUTION 
"Fitness is a property, not of an individual, but of a class of individuals — for example 
homozygous for allele A at a particular locus. Thus the phrase ’expected number of offspring’ 
means the average number, not the number produced by some one individual. If the first 
human infant with a gene for levitation were struck by lightning in its pram, this would not 
prove the new genotype to have low fitness, but only that the particular child was unlucky." 
–Maynard Smith (1920-2004) 
 
“The essence of the genetical theory of natural selection is a statistical bias in the relative 
rates of survival of alternatives (genes, individuals, etc.). The effectiveness of such bias in 
producing adaptation is contingent on the maintenance of certain quantitative relationships 
among the operative factors. One necessary condition is that the selected entity must have a 
high degree of permanence and a low rate of endogenous change, relative to the degree of 
bias (differences in selection coefficients). Permanence implies reproduction with a potential 
for geometric increase.” 
 –George Williams (1926-2010) 
As with all other organs, nervous systems consist of interacting tissues shaped by evolution 
according to two general categories of selective pressures: 1) maintaining and expanding 
the homeostatic boundaries of organisms, or 2) facilitating reproduction (A. Damasio, 2000, 
2003; Panksepp, 1998). Homeostatic boundaries are the range of conditions under which 
organisms can function and maintain essential processes for self-preservation (Heylighen, 
1992; Heylighen & Joslyn, 2003; Rudrauf, Lutz, Cosmelli, Lachaux, & Le Van Quyen, 2003; 
Waddington, 1953a). Expanding these boundaries enables increased flexibility in the 
Darwinian struggle for existence wherein individuals compete for access to limited 
resources (e.g. food, territory) within their respective niches (Aldrich et al., 2008; Gause, 
1934). However, this competitive advantage only translates into evolutionary fitness if it 
also contributes to reproductive success for organisms with genes supporting these 
adaptations. 
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For example, different organisms have varying nutritional requirements that must be 
satisfied if they are to survive. These requirements represent homeostatic boundaries in 
that unless adequate nutrition is obtained, the organism will be unable to continue 
functioning and will eventually die. Yet, these boundaries include more than just the 
current physiological status of the organism, but also the availability of nutrient sources. 
Nervous systems can expand these boundaries if they make organisms more effective at 
obtaining food in a wider variety of circumstances. Nervous systems can also result in 
behaviors—and even technologies—that allow a wider variety of food sources to be 
metabolized (e.g. red colobus monkeys eating charcoal in order to neutralize toxins 
(Struhsaker, Cooney, & Siex, 1997)). However, biological features that enable this flexibility 
will only have positive adaptive significance if they also result in increased replication of 
the underlying genetic information.  
From the gene-centered view of evolution, individuals are mere “vehicles” for the “true 
replicators” instantiated in genes, which in turn code for the phenotypic properties that 
define particular organisms (Richard Dawkins, 1976; Williams, 1966). That is, genes 
influence the development of organ systems in ways that generally increased the likelihood 
of spreading those genes within the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this way, 
genes are able to increase the likelihood that they will be replicated by shaping phenotypes 
such that organisms are more likely to survive and reproduce. Indeed, evolutionary fitness 
corresponds to the degree to which adaptations maximize the overall replication of specific 
genetic patterns (i.e., inclusive fitness), regardless of whether or not it promotes the 
survival and reproduction of the individual organisms containing those genes (Richard 
Dawkins, 1999; Nowak, 2006). 
Evolutionary theorists have intensely debated this gene-centered view, with alternative 
proposals suggesting that the sum-total of phenotypic traits constituting the organism is the 
most appropriate unit of selection, or that selective pressures must be considered on 
multiple levels of organization (Gould, 1992; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995). From an 
organismic perspective, both genotypes and phenotypes exist within the context of 
(reciprocally) causal networks where individual features are meaningless outside of their 
interactions within functional cycles, wherein various systems synergistically interact 
(Huang, 2012; Lane, 2005; Slack, 2002; Von Uexküll, 1957). Further, genes are only capable 
of replicating via selection upon phenotypes, which emerge through complexly determined 
developmental processes (i.e., ontogeny) (Northcutt, 1990; Wagner & Laubichler, 2004). 
Genes figure centrally in development, but these processes are also impacted by non-
genetic factors such as environmental circumstances. Indeed, genes are only able to impact 
phenotypes by influencing dynamics within and between cells that function in the 
hierarchical contexts of tissues, organs, organ systems, organisms, and ecosystems 
(Barbieri, 2008; Jablonka & Lamb, 2007; Kohl, 2012). Further, the functioning of gene 
networks within and between cells is a product of their unique developmental histories 
within the context of the overall organism, which influence partially heritable epigenetic 
processes that determine the levels of expressions for various genes (Haslberger, Varga, & 
Karlic, 2006; P. A. Jones & Takai, 2001; E. K. Murray, Hien, de Vries, & Forger, 2009). In this 
way, genotypes do not deterministically specify phenotypes, but instead probabilistically 
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influence which phenotypes are likely to emerge via interactions within and between 
multiple hierarchical levels of organization. 
More specifically, the organismic property of phenotypic plasticity describes how a given 
genotype can produce a different phenotypes in response to varying environmental 
conditions (Badyaev, 2009; Baldwin, 1896; Ernande & Dieckmann, 2004; Johnston & 
Gottlieb, 1990; Lessells, 2008; Price, Qvarnström, & Irwin, 2003; Waddington, 1953a, 
1953b). This phenotypic variability provides a diversity of forms that can influence fitness 
within a niche. The “Baldwin effect” refers to the phenomenon of this plasticity-based 
differential fitness resulting in selection for the heritable aspects of the phenotypic 
varieties that are most highly adaptive. Alternatively, this genetic accommodation of traits 
in response to novel selective pressures can also be conceived of in terms of genetic 
assimilation, whereby the developmental process is canalized (i.e., shaped) in a way that it 
is more likely to produce phenotypes that were adaptive in the environment in which they 
were selected.8 Canalization is a complimentary principle to phenotypic plasticity, in that it 
refers to the ability of similar phenotypes to result from a variety of environments and 
genotypic configurations. While phenotypic plasticity supports adaptive flexibility, 
canalization supports the robustness of specific functions. These concepts clearly 
demonstrate the probabilistic relationship between genotypes and phenotypes, providing 
examples of emergent properties that must be considered in assessing the functional 
significance of genetic replicators. 
However, the organismic and gene-centered perspectives are compatible when viewed as 
complimentary analyses on different levels of abstraction. For example, in the theory of 
extended phenotypes—beyond influencing the physiological processes of individual 
organisms containing those genes—phenotypes have blurry boundaries in that they 
include a variety of knock-on effects, such as the impacts of organisms on their 
environments (e.g. beaver dams), which can also include influences on the behaviors of 
other organisms (e.g. toxoplasmosis parasitism) (Richard Dawkins, 1999; Dennett, 2009; 
House, Vyas, & Sapolsky, 2011). Although genetic maximization is the primary determinant 
of evolutionary outcomes in these models, they also encompass the complex interactions 
that mediate the relationship between genotypes and selective pressures. 
Interactive dynamics notwithstanding, the temporal stability of genetic replicators is a 
necessary condition for optimized complexity to accrue via natural selection. Since genes— 
and to varying degrees, heritable epigenetic patterns—are the only aspects of organisms 
that persist over multiple generations, the relative proliferation of these replicators are the 
“bottom-line” for cumulative selection (Dennett, 1996). In this way, differential genetic 
replication—broadly construed to include epigenetic inheritance—is the ultimate 
determinant of adaptive significances that allow populations to climb fitness landscapes on 
                                                        
8 Although distinctions can be made between the Baldwin effect and genetic assimilation (Crispo, 2007), for 
our purposes, the latter can be considered to be a restatement of the former from an evolutionary 
developmental perspective (King & Bjorklund, 2010; Mills & Watson, 2005; Pigliucci, 2009; Wagner & 
Laubichler, 2004). 
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evolutionary timescales (i.e., phylogeny) (Richard Dawkins, 1996a, 1997). However, this 
differential replication is determined by the functional properties of phenotypes mediating 
the relationship between selective pressures and genotypes. In this way, both the gene-
centered and organismic perspectives are necessary in order to fully characterize 
evolutionary dynamics. 
RESOLVING THE UNIT OF SELECTION DEBATE USING MEDO: SELFISH REPLICATORS AND 
THEIR GAME-THEORETIC INTERACTIONS WITHIN EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS 
"We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and, if necessary, the selfish memes 
of our indoctrination. We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing 
pure, disinterested altruism - something that has no place in nature, something that has never 
existed before in the whole history of the world. We are built as gene machines and cultured 
as meme machines, but we have the power to turn against our creators. We, alone on earth, 
can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators." 
–Richard Dawkins (1941-present) 
 
"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." 
 –Adam Smith (1723-1790) 
Whether considered in terms of genotypes or phenotypes, evolutionary fitness is 
determined by the reproductive success of all organisms sharing those traits. Yet, sexual 
reproduction allows different versions of genes (i.e., alleles) to be combined in different 
ways in different organisms (Ridley, 1993). Since each allele can be thought of as a separate 
heritable element, the adaptive significances of traits are partially independent from other 
traits, as well as the reproductive success of any given individual. In light of this partial 
independence with respect to selective pressures for different genes, Dawkins (1976) 
argued for using a “gene’s-eye view” that conceptualizes evolution in terms of the activity 
of “selfish” replicators (Richard Dawkins, 1976). These replicators are considered to be 
selfish in that they function as if they possessed a singular goal for maximizing their own 
proliferation, with all other outcomes being means to this end. 
This sort of goal-directedness is clearly illusory with respect to genes, but all teleonomy is 
described with EDT in the MEDO framework. If a utility function were ascribed to a 
replicator, it would necessarily be self-interested by virtue of the characteristics that define 
it as a replicating phenomenon. That is, replicators behave as if they value the replication of 
their forms. Yet, it is frequently more rational for selfish actors to coordinate in avoiding 
competition and cooperatively maximizing utility, depending on game-theoretic 
considerations that define incentive structures for interactions (Faratin et al., 2002; Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Biological replicators must coordinate their functioning if 
they are to ensure the survival of the organismic “vehicles” upon which they depend for 
their proliferation, and cooperative synergy may be just as fundamental as competition in 
shaping evolutionary outcomes (Nowak, 2006). 
However, MEDO uses EDT to characterize all teleonomic phenomena in terms of natural 
selection, rather than the replicative properties of individual patterns. Although replicators 
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can be thought of as selecting interactions in which their forms are perpetuated, they are 
also selected by emergent causal dynamics of systems that enable replication. That is, 
broader evolutionary systems provide contexts that determine the relative success of 
various replicative dynamics. These systemic properties could be thought of as defining 
incentive structures for the interactions of selfish replicators, with fitness maxima 
representing game-theoretic equilibria (Maynard Smith, 1982; Nowak & Sigmund, 2004; J. 
M. Smith, 1976).9 In addition to the replicator’s-eye view, MEDO adopts the evolutionary-
system’s-eye view, focusing on the emergent dynamics that determine selective pressures. 
This alternative focus does not refute the validity of the gene-centered view, but subsumes 
it—as well as evolutionary game theory—thereby providing a compatible level of analysis 
for understanding these complex phenomena. 
By applying EDT to evolutionary systems, MEDO clarifies the relationships between gene-
centered and organismic perspectives. To the extent that some phenotypic traits increase 
fitness more than others, the relative strengths of the selective pressures influencing 
differential replication correspond to an abstract utility function—or fitness function—
describing the relative likelihoods that the underlying genes (and heritable epigenetic 
patterns) will either increase or decrease in prevalence. From the organismic perspective, 
this evolutionary utility function would be expressed in terms of the fitness consequences 
of the phenotypes, which mediate the relationships between selective pressures and 
genotypes. However, the adaptive significances of phenotypic traits are completely 
conditional upon their impacts on differential genetic proliferation. These forms will not be 
replicated unless their underlying genetic information is passed on to future generations. 
The utility function of an economic agent is meaningless outside of its ability to make 
choices. Similarly, genetic utility must be considered in terms of the resulting phenotypes, 
which influence likelihoods that various genes will be replicated. Hence, phenotypes can be 
viewed as revealed preferences of evolutionary systems in which expected utilities are 
defined by the likelihoods that the underlying genes will either increase or decrease in 
prevalence. Differential genetic replication shapes phenotypes, but the emergent 
properties of phenotypic traits also shape gene frequencies on the population level. Indeed, 
reciprocal causation defines the relationship between genotypes and phenotypes in natural 
selection. Thus, MEDO clearly demonstrates that the gene-centered and organismic 
perspectives are not just compatible, but complimentary. 
MEDO considers multiple units of selection to varying degrees, depending on context. A 
Darwinian/EDT analysis is applied to all levels at which significant replicative dynamics 
can be identified, as this will determine the extent to which systems can be characterized as 
having evolutionary properties. Indeed, there are fuzzy boundaries between replicative 
and non-replicative phenomena, in that patterns exist in terms of their ability to impact 
particular causal systems (Jablonka & Lamb, 2007; Shay, 2010), and these impacts are 
always a matter of degree, even when they contribute to emergent differences in kind. All 
                                                        
9 More specifically, evolutionary outcomes would tend to represent mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, where all 
“players” (i.e., replicators) select their best responses, given the likely best responses of all other players. 
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of the defining characteristics of natural selection (i.e., replication, variation, and selection) 
can only be quantified with limited precision, and to the extent that this quantification is 
possible, functional significance can be difficult to determine. For example, although 
mutation rates can be compared, and population-level changes in allele frequencies 
estimated, the strength of selection pressures on different phenotypes changes 
continuously on multiple levels. Or with respect to cultural evolution, selective pressures 
may be highly variable, and precise replicators may be unidentifiable, but natural selection 
still occurs on the level of culture (Aldrich et al., 2008; Nowak, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 
2004; N. S. Thompson, 1998; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006; Wilson, 1994). Something may be 
difficult to precisely quantify, yet still have significant causal properties. 
In light of these epistemological challenges, we may be limited in the extent to which we 
can specify the relative contributions of different selective dynamics to shaping motivation. 
However, these difficulties can be partially ameliorated by using evolutionary and 
developmental constraints to limit the range of plausible hypotheses, thereby enhancing 
inferential power. In the following discussions, by considering the means by which 
selective pressures interact with developing nervous systems, we will attempt to estimate 
the relative extent to which various dynamics are likely to influence preferences. 
EVOLUTIONARY-DEVELOPMENTAL UTILITY FUNCTIONS: PHYLOGENY AS ONTOGENY; 
ONTOGENY AS PHYLOGENY 
"My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its 
force (its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually 
encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement 
('union') with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together 
for power. And the process goes on." 
–Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
 
“Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are 
capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is 
grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a 
few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed 
law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful 
have been, and are being, evolved.” 
 –Charles Darwin (1809-1882) 
Both the temporal stability of genetic replicators and their phenotypic consequences are 
necessary conditions for the accumulation of optimized complexity through phylogeny. 
However, the ontogeny (i.e., development) of individual organisms represents an additional 
selective process that always mediates the production of phenotypes from genotypes. More 
specifically, since the maturation of organisms involves replication, variation, and selection 
of cells and other biological patterns—in addition to being a product of phylogeny—
development is necessarily an evolutionary process in its own right, sui generis. Hence, the 
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developmental process selects among interacting ontogenetic replicators, thereby resulting 
in particular mechanisms, the sum-total of which constitute particular phenotypes.10 
As with all other evolutionary systems, MEDO models development as a kind of natural 
selection, thereby constituting an optimization process that can be characterized in the 
language of EDT. To the extent that particular gene networks influence the development of 
particular phenotypes, the relative strengths of organizing processes correspond to an 
abstract utility function—or fitness function—describing the relative likelihoods for the 
emergence of different phenotypes. Hence, MEDO formalizes Waddington’s (1953) 
proposal that the relative likelihoods of development being shaped in different ways 
correspond to the topology of epigenetic landscapes (Huang, 2012; Waddington, 1953a, 
1953b). That is, if gene networks specify the kinds of “utility” that influence developmental 
processes, then the theoretical graphs of these ontogenetic utility functions can be 
visualized as high-dimensional landscapes in which biological patterns evolve to create 
organisms with particular combinations of phenotypic traits. Thus, the evolution of genetic 
replicators through differential reproduction (i.e., phylogeny), of phenotypes through 
development (i.e., ontogeny), and of agents through experience (i.e., goal-oriented 
behavior) can all be represented by their respective theoretical utility functions and 
landscapes, corresponding to the expected prevalence of different outcomes. 
Ontogenetic utility can be viewed as an additional ultimate-level cause for the creation of 
phenotypes, with particular cellular and systems-level physiological processes acting as 
proximate-level means of realizing the implicit preferences of gene networks. Hence, genes 
can act as ultimate-level biological causes in two senses: 1) phylogenetically acting as 
replicators that shape phenotypes to maximize their proliferation; 2) ontogenetically acting 
as causal networks in order to shape developmental processes that maximize the 
replication of particular phenotypic patterns. Ontogeny plays a dual evolutionary role as a 
proximate-level implementational mechanism for genetic replicators, and as an ultimate-
level cause in-and-of-itself. In this way, phylogeny can be understood as a kind of meta-
evolution selecting among genotype-phenotype developmental pathways, which themselves 
function as evolutionary systems selecting among ontogenetic replicators. 
Since the particular configurations of gene networks influencing ontogeny result from a 
history of phylogeny, phylogenetic and ontogenetic utility functions (i.e., abstract 
descriptions of what is likely to be adaptive and what is likely to develop, respectively) will 
tend to be highly similar under normal circumstances. That is, organisms will tend to 
develop such that they function in ways that increase replication of the genes contributing 
to the formation of their particular phenotypes. However, these utility functions are never 
perfectly aligned for a variety of reasons. For example, while environmental conditions may 
change rapidly and non-linearly, genotype compositions tend to change gradually—
although not always—through cumulative selection (Eldredge & Gould, 1972; Gilad, 
                                                        
10 Importantly, since phenotypes have blurry boundaries, ontogeny extends beyond the physiological 
maturation of particular organisms—processes that continue over entire lifespans—including factors such as 
the formation of behavioral interactions and other niche modifications with adaptive significances. 
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Oshlack, Smyth, Speed, & White, 2006). If a population contains adaptive genotype-
phenotype pathways, then these multilevel evolutionary utility functions are likely to 
become increasingly aligned as these replicators spread through the population over 
multiple generations. 
Alternatively, if no adaptive genotype-phenotype pathways are present, then time will be 
needed for the requisite mutations to arise. Most mutations are neutral in their effects, but 
when they do have functional significance, they are most likely to be (mildly) deleterious, 
and only rarely infer an adaptive benefit (Fay, Wyckoff, & Wu, 2001). More specifically, a 
single genetic alteration can change the functional interactions of gene networks in 
multiple ways (i.e., epistasis), thus potentially creating nonlinear changes in phenotypes. If 
such a nonlinear change occurs, it is prima facie unlikely to be adaptive in light of the fact 
that physiology has been subject to a distributed optimization process, operating over 
geological timescales.11 However, if an adaptive phenotype-inducing mutation does arise, 
then differential rates of reproduction for organisms containing those mutations is likely to 
align phylogenetic and ontogenetic utility functions. 
Indeed, the degree of evolvability of particular mechanisms is determined by their abilities 
to minimize discrepancies between selective pressures and developmental biases. In order 
to ascertain the likelihood of a mechanism evolving, all relevant phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic dynamics must be considered simultaneously, on all levels at which functional 
interactions take place. Although we are necessarily limited in the rigor with which such an 
analysis can be conducted, relative evolvability can be qualitatively estimated. The number 
and strength of selective pressures for a particular adaptation influences the probability 
that one or more proximate mechanisms are likely to develop. The number and variety of 
developmental pathways that could produce a proximate mechanism influence the 
probability that one or more of those pathways will be selected. In this way, as we will 
demonstrate in the following sections, the mutual constraints of phylogeny and ontogeny 
influence the degree to which we can predict the relative likelihoods for evolution giving 
rise to different mechanisms. 
THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF HUMAN MINDS  
EVOLVING NERVOUS SYSTEMS 
“Let us assume that the persistence or repetition of a reverberatory activity (or "trace") tends 
to induce lasting cellular changes that add to its stability.… When an axon of cell A is near 
enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth 
process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A's efficiency, as one of 
the cells firing B, is increased.” 
 –Donald Hebb (1904-1985) 
                                                        
11 Consequently, molecular error-correction mechanisms exist to ensure that mutations are relatively rare 
events, even though there can be adaptive variability in mutation rates (Lynch, 2010, 2011), and macro-
mutations occasionally take place (Larsson et al., 2008). 
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"If the inputs to a system cause the same pattern of activity to occur repeatedly, the set of 
active elements constituting that pattern will become increasingly strongly interassociated. 
That is, each element will tend to turn on every other element and (with negative weights) to 
turn off the elements that do not form part of the pattern. To put it another way, the pattern 
as a whole will become 'auto-associated'. We may call a learned (auto-associated) pattern an 
engram." 
–Gordon Allport (1887-1967) 
MEDO not only analyzes development in terms of the ways that it has been shaped by 
evolution, but it considers neurodevelopment to represent an additional kind of 
evolutionary process for increasing phenotypic plasticity. Networks of neurons allow 
nervous tissue to have a uniquely plastic internal structure, whereby specialized cells are 
capable of changing their functional interconnectivity on the basis of patterns of activity 
that spread through these connections. These connections define “cell assemblies” or 
systems of neurons with functional significance for other systems (Hayek, 1952; Hebb, 
1949). The activity dependent creation and re-formation of cell assemblies has been most 
simply expressed in the maxim: “fire together, wire together” (Shatz, 1996). As organisms 
interact with the world, these different assemblies form interconnections on the basis of 
correlated activity, and thus create auto-associated networks of increasing complexity and 
specificity (i.e., “engrams”) (Allport, 1985; James, 1890; Schott, 2011). 
Similarly to how phenotypic plasticity facilitates adaptation on the population level, 
neuroplasticity is a particularly powerful variety of phenotypic plasticity that facilitates 
adaptive behaving on the level of both populations and individuals. Under the MEDO 
framework, learned behaviors are considered to be “adaptive” in an evolutionary sense 
because the learning process itself is considered to be a form of natural selection. More 
specifically, neuroplasticity creates an evolutionary optimization process whereby specific 
patterns are selected within the nervous systems of individual organisms based on their 
relative abilities to facilitate dynamics that tend to maximize evolutionary fitness on 
multiple levels. By enabling natural selection to take place within nervous systems, 
evolution gave rise to selective dynamics that were able to operate far more rapidly than 
trial-and-error on the level of populations, and thus more effectively optimize behavior. In 
the parlance of EDT, to the extent that learning processes favor some patterns over others, 
an implicit utility function specifies the relative likelihoods that various patterns will be 
learned, and differential prevalence can be expected to reflect the relative strengths of 
these learning biases. To the extent that learned patterns correspond to behaviors, these 
utility functions are identical to those for agent preferences, and can be thought of as the 
emergent property of the sum-total of selective pressures within the nervous system. 
As previously described, the relationship between an organism and its environment is 
always interactive, involving both continuous exchanges of matter and energy, as well as 
multiple levels of mutually constraining feedback processes. However, the evolution of 
rapid electrochemical signaling in neuronal networks allowed organisms to be even more 
responsive to their environments. Although the functioning of biological systems always 
involves circular causation (Haslberger et al., 2006; Wagner & Laubichler, 2004), nervous 
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systems increase the non-linearity of these processes through experience-based self-
modification, which in turn influences the experiences that are likely to be encountered by 
those modifiable systems. This capacity for self-organization enables behavioral flexibility, 
and it is the adaptive payoff that allowed for the evolution of adaptations as complex and 
metabolically intensive as nervous systems (Attwell & Laughlin, 2001; Heylighen, 1992, 
1999; Heylighen & Joslyn, 2003; Howarth, Gleeson, & Attwell, 2012). 
The means by which these processes of self-organization give rise to optimized functioning 
were first proposed by Hayek (1952), and were later described by Edelman (1987) in his 
theory of “Neural Darwinism” (Edelman, 1993; Hayek, 1952; McDowell, 2010; Seth & 
Baars, 2005; Wyckoff, 1987). Edelman’s model of “neuronal group selection” proposes that 
neural patterns evolve, compete, and cooperate on the level of systems of connected 
neurons that he refers to as “ensembles” (Edelman, 1993; Wyckoff, 1987).12 In this theory, 
phenotypic plasticity plays a central role in that genes do not precisely specify the 
anatomical features of individual neurons. Rather, genes specify developmental processes 
whereby dynamically altering populations of cells provide an initial diversity of forms, 
which can be selected from on the basis of patterns of connectivity between neuronal 
processes. In this way, like any other organ, genes are capable of generating highly complex 
internal microstructure, but with no particular cell being special a priori to the 
developmental process.13 Out of this initial morphological diversity, a second evolutionary 
process arises whereby experience-dependent activity selects between groups of neurons 
on their ability to form coherent cell assemblies that are capable of mutually stimulating 
each other through reentrant signaling. 
This Darwinian perspective helps to explain the adaptive significance of the massive 
neuronal pruning that takes place over the course of development, and can extend for 
almost three decades in humans (Gogtay et al., 2004; Sisk & Foster, 2004). Initially, an over-
abundance of neurons are generated, but only those neurons that receive adequate 
stimulation from other neurons undergo survival-enhancing metabolic changes, such as the 
release of neurotrophic growth factors that inhibit the default processes of programmed 
cellular death (i.e., apoptosis) (T. Elliott, Maddison, & Shadbolt, 2001; Galuske, Kim, 
Castrén, & Singer, 2000; Galuske, Kim, Castren, Thoenen, & Singer, 1996; Hennigan, 
O’Callaghan, & Kelly, 2007). More specifically, groups of neurons receive this survival-
enhancing stimulation when they contribute to patterns of activity that facilitate dynamics 
that stimulate the ensembles in which they participate. Alternatively, neurons that fail to 
get taken up into coherently active groups do not receive this stimulation, and thus are 
eliminated via apoptosis. Further, processes of synaptic modification allow individual 
ensembles and systems of ensembles to plastically adapt in order to more effectively 
                                                        
12 We will use the terms ensemble and assembly interchangeably. 
13 Indeed, if the functional significance of particular neuronal connections are unpredictable a priori—
because of the sensitivity to initial conditions exhibited by complex systems (Elbert et al., 1994; Korn & Faure, 
2003; Rabinovich & Abarbanel, 1998; Wolfram, 2002)—then one could argue that even in principle, genes 
necessarily had to rely on novel optimization processes in order to produce adaptive configurations. 
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compete and cooperate in these selective processes (Caporale & Dan, 2008; Song, Miller, & 
Abbott, 2000; van Rossum, Bi, & Turrigiano, 2000). Moreover, ongoing synaptic 
modification—and potentially other mechanisms such as ongoing myelin production 
(Ullén, 2009)—allows neuroplasticity-based evolution to continue after the rate of 
neuronal pruning begins to slow post-adolescence (Honig & Rosenberg, 2000). 
Thus, for neural systems there are numerous mechanisms by which replication, variation, 
and selection can implement multilevel evolutionary processes. However, in order to 
predict what sorts of behavioral outcomes might result from these processes, it is 
necessary to identify the operative selective pressures as precisely as possible. Just as 
organ systems must operate cooperatively if the organism is to survive (Von Uexküll, 
1957), neural patterns must also form functional cycles for coherent information 
processing to occur. In this way, the informational ecosystem of an individual mind 
represents the primary niche for neural replicators. In order to survive, neural patterns 
must be perpetuated within systems on multiple interacting levels, the sum-total of which 
must allow the organism to effectively interact with its environment. Thus, neural patterns 
obtain functional significance in the context of embodied minds, embedded within 
environments. 
Neuronal activity corresponds to patterns of actions and perceived stimuli—both internal 
and external to the body—whose “isomorphic” relationships are due to connections 
between the nervous system and the sensors and effectors of the organism (Bridgeman & 
Tseng, 2011; Hayek, 1952; Hofstadter, 1979). In this way, neuronal patterns represent 
different aspects of the world, with the system-defined meanings of this activity ultimately 
grounded in the perceptions and actions of an organism coupling with its environment 
(Barsalou, 2008; JämsÄ, 2001; Rudrauf et al., 2003; Stella & Kleisner, 2010; Von Uexküll, 
1957; Ziemke & Sharkey, 2001). However, specific connections influence the probability of 
the patterns that flow through them and plastically shape them, both in terms of network 
dynamics, as well as through actions taken by the organism resulting in specific 
perceptions. This action-driven perception not only results from directed sensing, but also 
by way of more indirect pathways of actions initiating chains of events in the world on 
multiple timescales. 
EVOLUTIONARY UTILITY FUNCTIONS ON THE LEVELS OF POPULATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS 
To the extent that neurodevelopment can be canalized such that emergent evolutionary 
learning processes are more likely to favor genetically adaptive behaviors—within the 
respective environments of evolutionary adaptation—genetic accommodation can be 
expected to occur over time. On the population level, the relative likelihood of genetic 
assimilation facilitating these plastic behavioral phenotypes will tend to be a function of the 
relative degree of fitness provided, as well as the relative evolvability of these learning 
biases. In evolutionary psychology, the innate biasing of learning processes is referred to as 
“preparedness” and constitutes a means by which genetic natural selection was able to 
increase the probability that the utility functions of individual organisms will tend to 
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correspond with the utility functions of genetic replicators (R. J. McNally, 1987, 1995; 
Mineka & Ohman, 2002; Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971). 
This is yet another sense in which learned behaviors can be “adaptive,” except this sort of 
adaptive behavior corresponds to the implicit “preferences” of natural selection from the 
gene’s-eye view. Importantly, the abstract utility functions characterizing these choices 
may or may not correspond to the values of agents, either in terms of their individual 
genetic fitness or subjective values. Additionally, when learning processes achieved 
sufficient levels of complexity to enable cultural evolution, even more forms of utility 
became relevant. As previously described, in the same way that genotype-phenotype 
pathways converge, and in the same way that evolution and development are mutually 
constraining, multi-objective optimization for learning processes necessarily involves 
compromise among all of the conflicting and synergistic goals that interact in systems of 
causal relations (Abbas, 2010; D. E. Bell, 1979; Gw et al., 1995). Thus, with respect to 
evolving nervous systems, all selective dynamics compete and cooperate in determining 
the likelihood and prevalence of outcomes, from which the inferred utility function reflects 
the inclusive fitness of all replicators involved, on all levels to which they can interact to 
significant degrees.14 
Although the probabilistic nature of development may be a necessary consequence of the 
fact that “epigenetic landscapes” mediate the relationship between genotype and 
phenotype, phenotypic plasticity can itself have selective importance in helping 
populations of organisms to climb “fitness landscapes” via evolutionary adaptation (Huang, 
2012; Suzuki & Arita, 2007; Wright, 1932). Indeed, population-genetic defined fitness, 
organismic-shaping defined developmental forces, and agent-value defined motivation can 
all be thought of as selective processes whose nested interactions provide mutual-
constraints as they are partially integrated into a single abstract utility function that 
describes what will tend to be optimized. 
The degree to which the utility of different replicators drives optimization dynamics will 
depend on the timescales and contexts under consideration. Neuronal replicators and 
epigenetic-phenotypic pathways will dominate on timescales of individual organisms, but 
unless they can contribute to genetic proliferation, these selective dynamics will not 
influence outcomes on the level of populations of organisms changing over geological time. 
However, via the processes of genetic accommodation previously described, development 
can be canalized in a way that it is more likely to produce evolutionary dynamics that were 
adaptive in the environment in which they were selected. 
                                                        
14 Neural evolution creates optimized patterns of high complexity, and as such an engineering utility analysis 
is appropriate for understanding the resulting behaviors. Such an analysis is not just appropriate, but it 
describes a fundamental capacity that has become uniquely developed in humans over the course of genetic 
and cultural evolution. We constantly attempt to use the specific beliefs and desires of others in order to 
attempt to predict their values, and attempt to use values in order to predict specific beliefs and desires. 
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THE EVOLUTION OF GENE-CULTURE CO-EVOLUTION 
“As soon as the primeval soup provided conditions in which molecules could make copies of 
themselves, the replicators themselves took over. For more than three thousand million years, 
DNA has been the only replicator worth talking about in the world. But it does not necessarily 
hold these monopoly rights for all time. Whenever conditions arise in which a new kind of 
replicator can make copies of itself, the new replicators will tend to take over, and start a new 
kind of evolution of their own. Once this new evolution begins, it will in no necessary sense be 
subservient to the old. The old gene-selected evolution, by making brains, provided the `soup’ 
in which the first memes arose. Once self-copying memes had arisen, their own, much faster, 
kind of evolution took off. We biologists have assimilated the idea of genetic evolution so 
deeply that we tend to forget that it is only one of many possible kinds of evolution.” 
 –Richard Dawkins (1941-Present) 
Although there are reasons to believe that a dynamic probabilistic model is particularly apt 
for characterizing the changing utility functions of neural evolution, it also applies to all of 
the previously described engineering analyses of biological evolution involving circular 
causation. However, this complication can be greatly simplified in light of the fact that 
before cultural evolution appeared, gene-pathways were the only replicators capable of 
accumulating appreciable degrees of complexity on evolutionary time scales. Nervous 
systems greatly expanded phenotypic plasticity, but without robust transmission of this 
information between organisms, optimized complexity was limited in its ability to accrue. 
Thus, for most of evolutionary history, the existence of nervous systems did not change the 
fact that the utility function of natural selection was completely conditional upon genetic 
transmission, and thus maximization of gene frequencies on the population level 
dominated the optimization processes that shaped biological organisms. 
However, increasingly complex nervous systems allowed for increasingly complex social 
relationships between organisms and groups of organisms.15 To the extent that varying 
features of these groups had differential effects in their ability to contribute to group 
preservation over time—corresponding to the definition of replication for generalized 
Darwinism—these groups would have represented a partially independent source of 
evolutionary utility. These selective processes operated on time scales where they were 
able to accrue optimized complexity and drive behavioral dynamics (N. S. Thompson, 1998; 
Wilson, 1994), and thus drive the evolution of neural replicators both between and within 
individual organisms. Similarly, non-genetic replicators increased reliance on navigating 
social alliances, thus providing a selective pressure for further intelligence (Lefebvre, 2012; 
L. McNally, Brown, & Jackson, 2012; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011). 
                                                        
15 This should not be taken to imply that organisms with simple nervous systems are unable to engage in 
complex social interactions, as are clearly evidenced in the behavior of eusocial insects (Anfora et al., 2011; 
Patalano, Hore, Reik, & Sumner, 2012). However, the interactions between eusocial insects are more likely to 
be governed by processes that depend on relatively simple algorithms, compared with the rich modeling of 
other organisms made possible by the increased nervous system complexity of mammals. Alternatively, in the 
study of non-linear deterministic systems, one of the most significant—and surprising—findings to emerge is 
that even simple algorithms can yield enormous complexity (Wolfram, 2002). 
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To the extent that variations of behavioral patterns resulted in differential preservation of 
those patterns over time, a sort of proto-cultural evolution represented the emergence of 
another partially independent source of utility, in addition to the fitness of replicating 
groups and the genes of group members. None of these forms of utility were uniquely 
independent in that they mutually influenced the degree to which optimized complexity 
was able to accrue for each type of replicator. Indeed, not only were these replicators 
highly dependent upon each other, but their interactions enabled niche construction to 
occur with unprecedented rapidity via gene-culture coevolution and cultural group-
selection (A. Bell, 2010; Henrich, 2004; Lansing & Fox, 2011; Rendell, Fogarty, & Laland, 
2011). 
Once these synergistic selective pressures were able to produce shared attention and 
intentionality, imitative learning, and symbolic cognition and communication, the 
necessary conditions for human-like cultural evolution had been achieved (Tomasello, 
1999). Regardless of whether or not cultural natural selection is thought of in terms of 
replicating memes (Richard Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1992), this new optimization process 
represents a major transition in evolution (Jablonka & Lamb, 2007; Maynard Smith & 
Szathmáry, 1995). Not only did it radically increase the power of gene-culture coevolution 
and cultural group-selection, but it also allowed for new forms of natural selection to arise 
within individual nervous systems, and thus new types of utility (i.e., explicit meanings) 
were capable of shaping dynamics. 
Culture allows the processes of selection that take place within individual minds to be 
extended to other minds as well. Cultural replicators are capable of exploring multiple 
permutations of problems in parallel, as well as horizontally transmitting successful 
solutions between individuals.16 Additionally, robust transmission of information between 
individuals allows the optimized complexity of patterns within nervous systems to be 
extended over multiple generations. As previously discussed, temporal persistence of 
replicating dynamics is a necessary condition for specialized complexity to accrue. Thus, 
increased parallelism and multi-generational persistence vastly increased the power of 
culture as an optimization process. 
However, although an aspect of culture can spread because it is useful to individuals, it can 
also spread simply because the underlying patterns are good at replicating themselves, or 
because of chance. To the extent that units of selection can be identified for cultural 
evolution, the primary niche for these replicators would be the minds of individual 
organisms. Just as was previously described in applying an EDT analysis to evolutionary 
developmental biology more generally, within the nervous systems of individual learners, 
multiple forms of replicators all compete and cooperate in attempting to shape overall 
dynamics. For agents participating in culture construction, utility dynamics within their 
nervous systems are the result of these selective processes operating on multiple time 
                                                        
16 In contrast, genetic replicators primarily depend upon vertical transmission of information, albeit with 
notable exceptions for bacterial plasmid exchange—which increases the rate at which they can adapt to novel 
conditions—as well as retro-virus mediated trans-individual sequence insertion (Tetz, 2005). 
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scales. Thus, culture is not necessarily optimized for the utility of any given individual or 
group of individuals, but for the utility of cultural replicators. 
Nonetheless, because the success of cultural replicators is conditioned upon their ability to 
persist within nervous systems, overall cultural evolution is constrained by the utility 
dynamics of individuals. More specifically, to the extent that agents are “rational,” they will 
tend to invest resources in learning cultural information and transmitting it to the degree 
that they believe that these activities are relevant to their values. Since the emergent 
preferences of individual nervous systems will tend to be canalized in ways that increase 
genetic fitness, biological evolution is able to influence cultural evolution indirectly via 
biasing ‘action’ selection.17 
Thus, in addition to the processes of cultural group selection previously described, biology 
shapes and constrains culture in further ways. Because of these constraints, just as genetic 
replicators were able to increase their fitness (on average) by relying upon neural 
replicators, genetic fitness was enhanced (on average) to an even greater extent by reliance 
upon cultural replicators. Although the power of cultural optimization has been primarily 
discussed in terms of human-like cultural evolution, even sub-symbolic and non-imitative 
proto-cultures greatly enhance the power of learning processes. To the extent that 
dynamics of interaction are capable of persisting over time, optimized complexity can 
accrue, and thus individual animals are likely to benefit from social learning to the degree 
that it can occur (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). 
In terms of the analysis of “engineered” phenomena previously discussed, scientists 
encounter a challenging “reverse inference problem” (Poldrack, 2006, 2008, 2011). That is, 
since multiple causal pathways could lead to a given outcome, it is frequently unclear 
which selective pressures were operative in producing an adaptation. For similar reasons, 
it is extremely difficult to infer the extent and ways in which a specific aspect of behavior 
has been shaped by evolution on the level of genes, cultural factors, or gene-culture 
interactions. 
However, by using details of mechanistic implementation as converging lines of evidence, it 
is possible to make increasingly precise and reliable inferences. In the next section, we will 
discuss some of the ways that vertebrate nervous systems have been shaped in order to 
ensure that preferences on the levels of individual organisms tend to coincide with genetic 
fitness (on average). When viewed in terms of multi-level evolutionary optimization, one 
can begin to understand the mystery of how the limited complexity of the genome and 
epigenome are capable of ensuring adaptive functioning of a network with billions of 
heterogeneous neurons, each with thousands of connections (or more). 
THE NEURAL SYSTEMS BASIS OF MEDO 
                                                        
17 From an MEDO perspective, cognition and behavior necessarily have blurry boundaries, and actions are 
selected based on a variety of processes that may have little to do with specific motor sequences. 
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NEUROANATOMY AND PHYLOGENY 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
–George E. P. Box (1919 - present) 
MacLean’s “triune brain,” provides a useful but over-simplified model that analyzes the 
vertebrate nervous system in terms of a prehistoric reptilian brain, to which an ancient 
mammalian brain was added, which then provided the foundation for a more recently 
evolved neo-mammalian brain (MacLean, 1983; Ploog, 2003). The justification for this 
proposal derived from observations that nervous system homology—for both structure 
and function—is more extensive for phylogenetically older structures, and decreases in a 
graded fashion for structures that evolved more recently. It also corresponded with the 
intuition that rather than abandoning successful physiological adaptations, natural 
selection would be more likely to modify existing ‘designs’ by either making incremental 
alterations to existing structures, or by adding new structures with new functions. 
Additionally, the symptomatology of certain neuropsychiatric conditions—where 
developmentally acquired aspects of behavioral and emotional control were lost—seemed 
to support the 19th century maxim of “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” (Northcutt, 
1990). However, this model is also limited in that newly developed structures interact with 
older structures and thereby change their properties, sometimes to an extent that 
phylogenetically older structures have diverged as they became optimized to increase 
adaptive functioning under these new configurations (Butler & Hodos, 2005). Nonetheless, 
older levels of organization provide necessary scaffolding for newer levels to work, both in 
terms of evolution, development, and ongoing functioning (E. N. Brown, Lydic, & Schiff, 
2010; Långsjö et al., 2012; Merker, 2007; Panksepp, 1998, 2011). 
ACTION SELECTION AND THE BRAIN 
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” 
–Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-1975) 
Although all organisms face the challenge of creating coherent functioning from 
heterogeneous elements, the spinal column and brainstem were the first major selection 
systems to evolve in vertebrates (Humphries et al., 2007). All of the external and internal 
sensory systems of the body converge on the reticular nuclei of the brainstem, which in 
turn project to numerous structures and can influence movement via cranial nerves and 
spinal motor pools. This convergence of inputs and divergence of outputs provides a 
centralized location in which various patterns can compete and cooperate in determining 
the behavior of the organism. 
With respect to selecting between autonomic and neuroendocrine states, the hypothalamus 
is another structure with evolutionarily ancient origins (Hoebel, 1979; Jackson, 1981). The 
hypothalamus can be subdivided on the basis of anatomical features and functional 
properties, such as specific nuclei that mediate phylogenetically relevant behaviors (Pfaff & 
Sakuma, 1979). Further, through the pituitary gland, convergent inputs to the 
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hypothalamus allow for coherent, large-scale physiological changes in response to the 
overall state of the organism (Toni, Malaguti, Benfenati, & Martini, 2004). 
In addition to their other functions, brainstem and hypothalamic nuclei provide 
fundamental sources of neuroendocrine and autonomic control, which are basic types of 
‘action' selection. These structures are most clearly linked to biologically essential 
processes such as spinal-column reflexes for harm avoidance, brainstem nuclei modulating 
heart rate and respiration, or hypothalamic nuclei regulating “drives” for eating, drinking, 
or reproduction. In these ways, evolutionarily ancient substrates exist for enabling basic 
emotions, which can be thought of as coordinated changes in the body-brain state of the 
organism that prepare it to respond to a particular class of situations (A. D. Craig, 2003; A. 
D. B. Craig, 2004, 2009, 2011; A. Damasio, 2000, 2003; Panksepp, 1998). At their highest 
levels of abstraction, emotions are prototypes—or exemplar collections—of configurations 
of an organism’s self-representations, corresponding to classes of situations encountered in 
the process of engaging in goal-oriented behavior. 
These adaptations provide a means by which genetic natural selection was capable of 
influencing the primary sources of utility that shape evolution within individual organisms 
(Hall et al., 2000; Le Magnen, 1998; Pfaus et al., 2012). For example, if a pattern of activity 
results in successful feeding behaviors, projections from hypothalamic nuclei can stimulate 
neuromodulatory nuclei of the brainstem—where a single neuron can impact hundreds of 
thousands to millions of other neurons—which can then strengthen the connections 
between cell assemblies that contributed to that behavior (Butler & Hodos, 2005). To the 
extent that specific behaviors are “hard wired” into the brain, these “fixed action patterns” 
primarily consist of stereotyped muscular and neuroendocrine responses (e.g. the arching 
of the back involved in the lordosis mating reflex) (Eaton, Lee, & Foreman, 2001; Lin et al., 
2011; Pfaff & Sakuma, 1979; Sokolowski & Corbin, 2012). 
However, neural networks are inherently plastic, and thus the precise impacts of these 
primary reinforcers and action pattern generators will change through experience in even 
the simplest vertebrate nervous systems (Bolhuis, 1999). A particularly important factor 
influencing these shaping experiences will be the particular affordances and constraints 
associated with different body plans in different environments (Clark, 2008; Gibson, 1977; 
Hirose, 2002; Windridge & Kittler, 2010). In specifying particular aspects of embodiment, 
genes have yet another way of shaping utility dynamics within the organism. Thus, just as 
the functional significance of genes are determined by their ability to influence the multi-
level dynamics that create phenotypes, the functional significance of neural adaptations is 
determined by their ability to influence dynamics on multiple levels both internal and 
external to the body. Also, similarly to how epigenetic mechanisms allow experience to 
shape gene expression—and thus increase phenotypic plasticity—neural systems are also 
capable of being shaped by the dynamics they influence. 
Edelman’s characterization of the processes biasing neural evolution as “values” fits well 
with a EDT analysis of neuropsychological phenomena (Wyckoff, 1987). To the extent that 
genetically specified mechanisms are able to influence selection within nervous systems, 
they contribute to the processes that determine the fitness of neural replicators. The 
stronger the selective pressures, the more likely it is that different aspects of 
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neurophysiological functioning will have been shaped by these sources of utility. However, 
multiple needs must be satisfied in order for an organism to survive and reproduce, which 
themselves constitute values that are not always compatible (J. A. Miller, 2007). As 
previously described, since these different values form part of a common system, there is a 
sense in which each value competes and cooperates with every other value in shaping 
dynamics of multi-objective optimization. 
In the Darwinian struggle to shape utility dynamics, mechanisms that are more clearly 
“innate” have at least three important advantages over mechanisms that are more 
dependent upon learning. First, to the extent that these mechanisms are important for 
ensuring survival and reproduction (e.g. swallowing), specific details of neurophysiology 
may allow these adaptations to be particularly robust. Second, if these biologically essential 
mechanisms require frequent and precise modulation (e.g. amount of drinking), then there 
will be many opportunities for these selective pressures to shape dynamics. Third, if a 
selective pressure is capable of operating early in development (e.g. desire for water), it 
has a “first mover advantage” in shaping overall dynamics, and thus it may be able to 
maintain a dominant position relative to other values. However, even for behaviors as 
fundamental to survival as drinking, experience is required for newborn rats to learn the 
association between approaching water and obtaining hydration when thirsty (Hall et al., 
2000). 
Over the course of evolution, additional adaptations allowed for increasingly complicated 
utility dynamics to take place within nervous systems. The nuclei of the basal ganglia (BG) 
are crucial structures for enabling selection between potential motor sequences, which are 
capable of being modified on the basis of experience (Gurney et al., 2001; Houk et al., 
2007). BG neurons form segregated “loops” of mutually inhibitory connections with 
external structures, thus helping to ensure that only robust ensembles of neural patterns 
are capable of inhibiting their tonic inhibition. This disinhibitory configuration encourages 
“winner-take-all” dynamics by preventing weaker patterns from interfering with stronger 
patterns (Mao & Massaquoi, 2007; Rutishauser, Douglas, & Slotine, 2010), thus helping to 
ensure the functional coherence and stability of the collective neural activity underlying 
perception-action cycles. 
In humans, BG structures include the caudate, putamen, globus pallidus, substantia nigra, 
and subthalamic nuclei. In the caudate and putamen, collectively known as the striatum, 
the more dorsal division receives dopaminergic inputs from the substantia nigra and is 
more closely associated with specific motoric processes, while the more ventral division 
receives dopaminergic inputs from the ventral tegmentum and is associated with 
motivation more generally. Activations in the ventral striatum—which in humans, also 
refers to the dopaminergic projections to the nucleus accumbens and subcallosal cortex—
are often interpreted as indicating “reward”, along with other constructs such as prediction 
error, attention, or salience (K. S. Smith, Berridge, & Aldridge, 2011). Thus, reinforcement 
learning is more appropriately understood as a systems property of the brain that can 
involve many neural processes having little to do with specific hedonic experiences.  
The relative ease with which patterns are capable of disinhibiting themselves is highly 
dependent on dopamine levels within the basal ganglia (Gerfen & Surmeier, 2011; Haruno 
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& Kawato, 2006; Paladini, Celada, & Tepper, 1999). Multiple areas—including homeostatic 
regulatory nuclei—converge on dopaminergic neuromodulatory nuclei of the midbrain, 
and thus there is a sense in which fluctuating dopamine levels represent a kind of “common 
neural currency” that integrates different forms of utility (Leknes & Tracey, 2008; Watson, 
2008). However, since the conditions under which this currency increases or decreases 
depends on predicted outcomes (Bray & O’Doherty, 2007; Glimcher, 2011; Valentin & 
O’Doherty, 2009), these utility dynamics change as organisms learn through experience. 
Also, while these mechanisms play a key role in determining which behaviors are likely to 
be rewarded (Berridge, 2006), reward learning can occur in mice that have been 
genetically engineered to lack dopamine (Robinson, Sandstrom, Denenberg, & Palmiter, 
2005). Thus, it is important to keep in mind that there is no single criterion of selection 
within the brain, and there may even be “competing” neural currencies. 
These neural systems arose over 560 million years ago with important aspects of 
functioning being conserved in all vertebrates (Butler & Hodos, 2005; Stephenson-Jones, 
Ericsson, Robertson, & Grillner, 2012). However, these structures also became modified as 
expanded nervous system complexity provided them with new functional significances. 
CORTICAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
“There is nothing more practical than a good theory.” 
 –Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) 
The evolution of cortex allowed organisms to remember specific sequences of events from 
the past, and on the basis of these memories, predict specific sequences that might occur in 
the future. In Fuster’s (2006) model of cortex, memory and knowledge are represented in 
distributed and overlapping networks of interacting neurons that are “heterarchically” 
organized into functional cycles within perception-action hierarchies (Joaquin M Fuster, 
2007; Joaquín M Fuster, 2006, 2009; Joaquín M Fuster & Bressler, 2012). He refers to these 
auto-associated representational units as “cognits,” and considers them to be the elemental 
basis of cortical memory. Over the course of development, increasingly sophisticated 
representations evolve as more complex patterns are abstracted from simpler patterns, 
which allow new kinds of patterns to be discovered. From this perspective, nested 
dynamics of causal relations in the world are mirrored by nested dynamics of neuronal 
representations, which exist in varying degrees of abstraction and complexity with respect 
to perception-action sequences. 
Intuitively, hierarchical organization suggests that this gradient of increasing abstraction is 
reflected by locations of representations relative to primary sensory and motor cortices. 
That is, concrete perception-action sequences will be located closer to where sensations 
first input, and where specific motor commands first output. More abstract patterns (e.g. 
high-level goals) will be located closer to multi-modal association cortices and further from 
primary cortices. However, these abstract patterns will be connected to representations on 
multiple levels of the hierarchy on the basis of auto-associative links formed through past 
and ongoing experience. 
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Converging support for this theory is beginning to accumulate from the fields of 
computational neuroscience and machine learning. More specifically, it has been proposed 
that cortex may implement a common algorithm for hierarchical pattern abstraction, which 
affords complex associations that would be difficult to discover by statistical learning 
within non-hierarchically organized networks (Friston, 2008; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; 
George & Hawkins, 2009; Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004; Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008; 
Schofield et al., 2009). In addition to its theoretical parsimony, this hypothesis is supported 
by studies of cortical micro-circuitry. After discovering the existence of cortical columns in 
1978, Mountcastle suggested these structures potentially enabled a common 
computational process to take place throughout cortex (Mountcastle, 1978). More recently, 
machine learning systems are being developed in which hierarchically organized cortical 
columns constitute nodes within probabilistic networks for advanced pattern recognition 
(Hawkins, 2011).  
Cortex is anatomically distinguished by groups of approximately 80-100 neurons with 
common developmental origin, arranged into columns that are positioned perpendicularly 
to a cortical sheet with six semi-distinct layers (Krieger, Kuner, & Sakmann, 2007; 
Mountcastle, 1997).18 Except for a few differences in visual and motor cortices, these 
“minicolumns” show remarkable anatomical homogeneity across brain areas, as well as 
across different mammalian species. Notably, cytoarchitectonic characterization suggests 
that morphological variation is initially lacking, and diversity is created by experience 
(Buxhoeveden & Casanova, 2002; E. G. Jones & Rakic, 2010). Minicolumns further self-
organize into groups of approximately 60-100 units to form macrocolumns (H. Markram, 
2006). These macrocolumns, or “cortical modules” consist of multiple minicolumns bound 
together via short-range connections with similar, although still heterogeneous, response 
properties.19 The total number of cortical modules for an average human brain is difficult 
to precisely determine, with estimates ranging from one to two million columns (Johansson 
& Lansner, 2007). Although its specific functional importance has been the subject of 
debate (Horton & Adams, 2005)—partially due to inconsistent use of terminology—
columnar organization is a fundamental feature of cortex. 
Theoretically, cortex could efficiently select for utility maximizing sequences by minimizing 
the “free energy” of the underlying processes (Friston, 2010; Hawkins, 2011; Kozma, Puljic, 
                                                        
18 Although the “limbic” structures of the amygdala and hippocampus, as well as the “para-limbic” structures 
of the cingulate and insula are commonly referred to as “subcortical,” technically, they are all different kinds 
of cortex (Mesulam & Mufson, 1982). The amygdala and hippocampus have a three-layered structure, the 
surrounding areas of the amygdala and the parahippocampal cortex have a four-layer structure, the cingulate 
and insula have a five-layer structure, and neo-cortex has a six-layer structure. These different layers reflect 
the order that these structures mature over the course of development, as well as the order that they 
developed over the course of evolution, and are called archicortex, peri-allocortex, and iso-cortex, 
respectively. The significance of these different numbers of layers is currently unknown. 
19 Columnar modules have no relation or resemblance to the special-purpose computational modules 
discussed within evolutionary psychology. 
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Balister, Bollobas, & Freeman, 2004). If a minicolumn’s inputs are predicted in advance via 
stimulation of specific inhibitory interneurons within the column, then only those neurons 
without their respective inhibitory interneurons activated will increase their firing rates. 
However, if a sufficient number of non-predicted inputs occur, and a percolation threshold 
is surpassed, the entire column may become active, resulting in a cascade of activity-
predictions in functionally connected columns. Depending on the degree of functional 
connectivity with inhibitory interneurons of midbrain neuromodulatory nuclei (Watabe-
Uchida, Zhu, Ogawa, Vamanrao, & Uchida, 2012), any dynamic that causes overall activity 
to be reduced should result in decreased inhibition of the production of these 
neuromodulators. This net disinhibition would enhance the most robustly active patterns, 
strengthen the connections underlying these patterns (i.e. reinforcement), and thus 
increase the efficiency of the dynamics contributing to successful prediction (i.e. minimized 
error signals). 
Although this activity-minimizing algorithm could potentially result in stasis, regulatory 
nuclei of the hypothalamus and midbrain would stimulate these inhibitory interneurons to 
the degree that action is needed to restore homeostatic balances. Thus an organism could 
not remain permanently inactive, as physiological signals such as hunger would result in 
stimulation of these regulatory nuclei, whose activity can be thought of as signifying the 
distance from homeostatic set points, or as signifiers of biologically specified predictions 
for which deviations result in error signals. Over time, cortical dynamics resulting in the 
minimization of error signals from these regulatory nuclei will become distributed across 
the cortical heterarchy as habitual predictions. The impact of these habitual predictions on 
overall functioning would constitute the evolving utility function of the organism. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the body in providing an initial set of 
constraints and values for the evolving nervous system. Indeed, organisms may be such 
effective learners because they begin with a sense of their own embodiment as a kind of 
prototypical object from which they can partially generalize, and they pay attention to this 
object because it is directly connected to the mechanisms of reinforcement (Leknes & 
Tracey, 2008). This account of cognitive development can potentially explain the 
knowledge that infants possess (Carey & Gelman, 1991), as well as how they use it to 
partially generalize to other classes of phenomena, even sometimes incorrectly (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). 
Importantly, the functional significance of a particular cortical column or neuron emerges 
as a function of the unique experiences of an individual organism. Thus, it is unlikely that 
natural selection was capable of shaping behavior through genetically specified cortical 
representations, or responses to those representations. A priori, the non-linearity of 
development suggests that genetic selection would be unable to produce such adaptations, 
even with strong selective pressures. If a mechanism relies on pre-specifying details of 
biology that are unpredictable in principle (Elbert et al., 1994; Korn & Faure, 2003; 
Rabinovich & Abarbanel, 1998; Wolfram, 2002), then it is also un-evolvable. Functional 
predetermination is possible on the basis of cellular characteristics (e.g. excitatory vs. 
inhibitory, degree of dendritic/axonal branching), locations of neurons with specific 
cortical lamina, as well as relative positioning with respect to specific sensory inputs and 
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outputs to various effector systems. However, since the formation of specific connections is 
based on information that could not be known in advance, according to Edelman, all 
neurons are “gypsies” in the developing brain (Edelman, 1992). Exceptions seem to be rare, 
such as brainstem reticular neurons involved in the “escape reflex” (Eaton et al., 2001). 
Thus in maximizing fitness, genes necessarily relied upon additional optimization 
processes, which they could only influence indirectly, utilizing mechanisms for innate value 
setting to bias neuronal evolution. For example, connections between homeostatic 
regulatory nuclei and brainstem neurons controlling neuromodulator levels help to ensure 
that an organisms actions will be reinforced or punished based on their ability to 
contribute to survival. 
Although the existence of reliably predictable associations between cortical areas and 
cognitive functions may seem to challenge these claims, these regularities can also be 
explained in terms of experience shaping systems that self-organize through evolutionary 
processes. Indeed, inter-individual variability and developmental evidence suggest these 
associations are not genetically specified in any direct sense (Pataraia et al., 2004; Peelen, 
Glaser, Vuilleumier, & Eliez, 2009). 
However, to the extent that a hierarchical structure increases the predictability of cortical 
organization, it is probable that some degree of genetic accommodation has occurred. For 
example, it is not a coincidence that the area associated with language comprehension is 
located close to where auditory information first enters cortex. It is also not a coincidence 
that this area is just enough steps removed where intermediate cortex can divide time 
varying auditory sequences into phonemes, morphemes, syllables, and finally words. Nor is 
it a coincidence that this area is located close to "association cortex" where converging 
high-level patterns from multiple sensory modalities allow the meaning of symbols to be 
grounded. Again, since perception and action are intimately linked, it is not coincidental 
that this language comprehension area is located near speech production areas, which are 
themselves unsurprisingly located near areas of the motor-strip that control the tongue 
and mouth, as well as areas of the frontal lobes that support high-level goal 
representations. Indeed, none of this is surprising when the cortex is viewed as a 
heterarchical memory system for perception and action, grounded in the sensors and 
effectors of the body. 
To the extent that cortex could be expected to reliably self-organize in a way where these 
particular functions have these specific relative locations, genes would be likely to facilitate 
these processes by influencing any detail of physiology that would allow for evolving 
neural systems to more efficiently reach these fitness maxima. This sort of canalization can 
be realized through multiple neurodevelopmental pathways. Thus, neuropsychological 
phenomena can be genetically influenced to a significant degree, even if it is difficult to 
identify specific genotypic configurations that significantly contribute to the frequency of 
particular phenotypes. Mechanistic flexibility could potentially extend the range of 
phenomena with “innate” bases, but the inherent non-linearity of self-organizing systems 
limits predictability. This developmental uncertainty reduces the precision with which 
natural selection could specify which canals are likely to emerge within the extended 
epigenetic landscapes that shape evolving neural systems. 
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Although the most obvious change in cortex to take place over the course of evolution is 
that cerebral volumes have greatly increased, this expansion has been most pronounced in 
association cortices, particularly in humans (Preuss, 2011). Expanding the cortical 
heterarchy allowed for increasingly complicated and abstracted patterns (Premack, 1983), 
which as previously described, afforded enhanced social cognition and eventually cultural 
evolution. These additional dynamics greatly expanded the non-linearity of human 
development, which necessarily forced genetic replicators to increasingly rely upon 
general-purpose learning mechanisms for ensuring adaptive behavior. Further, to the 
extent that these dynamics are constrained by innately specified values, the information 
they provide will be increasingly reliable for enhancing genetic fitness (on average). Thus, 
even though “innate” factors contribute to determining behavior in all organisms, humans 
are unique in the extent to which they depend upon learning. 
REFERENCES 
Abbas, A. E. (2010). General Decompositions of Multiattribute Utility Functions with Partial 
Utility Independence. Journal of MultiCriteria Decision Analysis, 59(November 2009), 
37–59. doi:10.1002/mcda 
Aldrich, H., Hodgson, G., Hull, D., Knudsen, T., Mokyr, J., & Vanberg, V. (2008). In defence of 
generalized Darwinism. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 18(5), 577–596. 
doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0110-z 
Allport, D. A. (1985). Distributed memory, modular subsystems and dysphasia (pp. 32–60). 
Anfora, G., Rigosi, E., Frasnelli, E., Ruga, V., Trona, F., & Vallortigara, G. (2011). 
Lateralization in the invertebrate brain: left-right asymmetry of olfaction in bumble 
bee, Bombus terrestris. PloS One, 6(4), e18903. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018903 
Atran, S. (2001). The trouble with memes: Inference versus imitation in cultural creation. 
Human Nature, 12, 351–381. 
Attwell, D., & Laughlin, S. B. (2001). An energy budget for signaling in the grey matter of the 
brain. Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and Metabolism: Official Journal of the 
International Society of Cerebral Blood Flow and Metabolism, 21(10), 1133–1145. 
doi:10.1097/00004647-200110000-00001 
Ayala, F. J. (2007). Colloquium Papers: Darwin’s greatest discovery: Design without 
designer. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(suppl_1), 8567–8573. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0701072104 
Badyaev, A. V. (2009). Evolutionary significance of phenotypic accommodation in novel 
environments: an empirical test of the Baldwin effect. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 364(1520), 1125–1141. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0285 
Bak, P, & Paczuski, M. (1995). Complexity, contingency, and criticality. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 92(15), 6689–6696. 
 
48 
Bak, Per, Tang, C., & Wiesenfeld, K. (1987). Self-organized criticality: An explanation of the 
1/f noise. Physical Review Letters, 59(4), 381–384. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.59.381 
Baldwin, J. M. (1896). A New Factor in Evolution. The American Naturalist, 30(354), 441–
451. doi:10.1086/276408 
Barbieri, M. (2008). Biosemiotics: a new understanding of life. Die Naturwissenschaften, 
95(7), 577–599. doi:10.1007/s00114-008-0368-x 
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617–645. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 
Bawazer, L. A., Izumi, M., Kolodin, D., Neilson, J. R., Schwenzer, B., & Morse, D. E. (2012). 
Evolutionary Selection of Enzymatically Synthesized Semiconductors from 
Biomimetic Mineralization Vesicles. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1116958109 
Begon, M., Harper, J. L., & Townsend, C. R. (1999). Ecology: Individuals, Populations and 
Communities (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. 
Bell, A. (2010). Why cultural and genetic group selection are unequal partners in the 
evolution of human behavior. Communicative & Integrative Biology, 3(2), 159–161. 
Bell, D. E. (1979). Multiattribute Utility Functions: Decompositions Using Interpolation. 
Management Science, 25(8), 744–753. doi:10.1287/mnsc.25.8.744 
Berger, J. O. (1985). Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis. Springer. Retrieved 
from 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=oY_x7dE15_AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&d
q=%22bayesian+decision+theory%22&ots=wAJ4ubp0T6&sig=HjZdCHP61qcyI7Oq
wPCAuhD-Rvc 
Berridge, K. C. (2006). The debate over dopamine’s role in reward: the case for incentive 
salience. Psychopharmacology, 191(3), 391–431. doi:10.1007/s00213-006-0578-x 
Bolhuis, J. J. (1999). The development of animal behavior: from Lorenz to neural nets. Die 
Naturwissenschaften, 86(3), 101–111. 
Both, S., Spiering, M., Laan, E., Belcome, S., van den Heuvel, B., & Everaerd, W. (2008). 
Unconscious classical conditioning of sexual arousal: evidence for the conditioning 
of female genital arousal to subliminally presented sexual stimuli. The Journal of 
Sexual Medicine, 5(1), 100–109. doi:10.1111/j.1743-6109.2007.00643.x 
Boyd, & Richerson, P. J. (2000). Meme theory oversimplifies how culture changes. Scientific 
American, 283(4), 70–71. 
Bray, S., & O’Doherty, J. (2007). Neural coding of reward-prediction error signals during 
classical conditioning with attractive faces. Journal of Neurophysiology, 97(4), 3036–
3045. doi:10.1152/jn.01211.2006 
 
49 
Bridgeman, B., & Tseng, P. (2011). Embodied cognition and the perception-action link. 
Physics of Life Reviews, 8(1), 73–85. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2011.01.002 
Brown, E. N., Lydic, R., & Schiff, N. D. (2010). General anesthesia, sleep, and coma. The New 
England Journal of Medicine, 363(27), 2638–2650. doi:10.1056/NEJMra0808281 
Butler, A. B., & Hodos, W. (2005). Comparative Vertebrate Neuroanatomy: Evolution and 
Adaptation (2nd ed.). Wiley-Liss. 
Buxhoeveden, D. P., & Casanova, M. F. (2002). The minicolumn hypothesis in neuroscience. 
Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 125(Pt 5), 935–951. 
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5), 187–192. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010 
Campbell, J. (2009). Bayesian Methods and Universal Darwinism. AIP Conference 
Proceedings, 1193(1), 40–47. doi:doi:10.1063/1.3275642 
Caporale, N., & Dan, Y. (2008). Spike timing-dependent plasticity: a Hebbian learning rule. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 31, 25–46. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.31.060407.125639 
Carey, S., & Gelman, R. (1991). The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition. 
Psychology Press. 
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (1st 
ed.). Oxford University Press, USA. 
Coello, C. A. C., Dehuri, S., & Ghosh, S. (2009). Swarm Intelligence For Multi-Objective 
Problems in Data Mining. Springer. 
Craig, A. D. (2003). Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 13(4), 500–505. 
Craig, A. D. B. (2004). Human feelings: why are some more aware than others? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8(6), 239–241. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.04.004 
Craig, A. D. B. (2009). How do you feel--now? The anterior insula and human awareness. 
Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 10(1), 59–70. doi:10.1038/nrn2555 
Craig, A. D. B. (2011). Significance of the insula for the evolution of human awareness of 
feelings from the body. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1225, 72–82. 
doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.05990.x 
Crispo, E. (2007). The Baldwin effect and genetic assimilation: revisiting two mechanisms 
of evolutionary change mediated by phenotypic plasticity. Evolution; International 
Journal of Organic Evolution, 61(11), 2469–2479. doi:10.1111/j.1558-
5646.2007.00203.x 
 
50 
Damasio, A. (2000). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness (1st ed.). Mariner Books. 
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (1st ed.). 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Davies, A. P., Watson, R. A., Mills, R., Buckley, C. L., & Noble, J. (2011). “If you can’t be with 
the one you love, love the one you’re with”: how individual habituation of agent 
interactions improves global utility. Artificial Life, 17(3), 167–181. 
doi:10.1162/artl_a_00030 
Dawkins, R. (1983). Universal darwinism. Retrieved from 
http://www.citeulike.org/group/2050/article/1379902 
Dawkins, Richard. (1976). The Selfish Gene (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, USA. 
Dawkins, Richard. (1996a). River Out Of Eden: A Darwinian View Of Life. Basic Books. 
Dawkins, Richard. (1996b). The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a 
Universe without Design. W. W. Norton & Company. 
Dawkins, Richard. (1997). Climbing Mount Improbable. W. W. Norton & Company. 
Dawkins, Richard. (1999). The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene (Revised.). 
Oxford University Press, USA. 
Day, R. L., Laland, K. N., & Odling-Smee, F. J. (2003). Rethinking adaptation: the niche-
construction perspective. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 46(1), 80–95. 
Dennett, D. (1992). Consciousness Explained (1st ed.). Back Bay Books. 
Dennett, D. (1996). DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF 
LIFE. Simon & Schuster. 
Dennett, D. (2003). Freedom Evolves (illustrated edition.). Viking Adult. 
Dennett, D. (2009). Colloquium Papers: Darwin’s “strange inversion of reasoning.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(Supplement_1), 10061–10065. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0904433106 
Eaton, R. C., Lee, R. K. K., & Foreman, M. B. (2001). The Mauthner cell and other identified 
neurons of the brainstem escape network of fish. Progress in Neurobiology, 63(4), 
467–485. doi:10.1016/S0301-0082(00)00047-2 
Eckert, A. J., & Dyer, R. J. (2012). Defining the landscape of adaptive genetic diversity. 
Molecular Ecology, 21(12), 2836–2838. doi:10.1111/j.1365-294X.2012.05615.x 
Edelman, G. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On The Matter Of The Mind. Basic Books. 
 
51 
Edelman, G. (1993). Neural Darwinism: Selection and reentrant signaling in higher brain 
function. Neuron, 10(2), 115–125. doi:10.1016/0896-6273(93)90304-A 
Edelman, G., & Mountcastle, V. B. (1978). The Mindful Brain: Cortical Organization and the 
Group-Selective Theory of Higher Brain Function (1st ed.). MIT Press. 
Elbert, T., Ray, W. J., Kowalik, Z. J., Skinner, J. E., Graf, K. E., & Birbaumer, N. (1994). Chaos 
and physiology: deterministic chaos in excitable cell assemblies. Physiological 
Reviews, 74(1), 1–47. 
Eldredge, & Gould, S. J. (1972). Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism, 
82(5), 82–115. doi:10.1037/h0022328 
Elliott, T., Maddison, A. C., & Shadbolt, N. R. (2001). Competitive anatomical and 
physiological plasticity: a neurotrophic bridge. Biological Cybernetics, 84(1), 13–22. 
Ernande, B., & Dieckmann, U. (2004). The evolution of phenotypic plasticity in spatially 
structured environments: implications of intraspecific competition, plasticity costs 
and environmental characteristics. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 17(3), 613–628. 
doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2004.00691.x 
Faratin, P., Klein, M., Sayama, H., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2002). Simple Negotiating Agents in 
Complex Games: Emergent Equilibria and Dominance of Strategies. In J.-J. Meyer & 
M. Tambe (Eds.), Intelligent Agents VIII (Vol. 2333, pp. 367–376). Springer Berlin / 
Heidelberg. Retrieved from 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/6xv96rutcfjgc9q1/abstract/ 
Fay, J. C., Wyckoff, G. J., & Wu, C.-I. (2001). Positive and Negative Selection on the Human 
Genome. Genetics, 158(3), 1227–1234. 
Foley, R. (1995). The adaptive legacy of human evolution: A search for the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 
4(6), 194–203. doi:10.1002/evan.1360040603 
Fracchia, J., & Lewontin, R. C. (2005). The Price of Metaphor. History and Theory, History 
and Theory, 44, 44(1, 1), 14, 14–29, 29. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2303.2005.00305.x, 
10.1111/j.1468-2303.2005.00305.x 
Friston, K. (2008). Hierarchical models in the brain. PLoS Computational Biology, 4(11), 
e1000211. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000211 
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience, 11(2), 127–138. doi:10.1038/nrn2787 
Friston, K., & Kiebel, S. (2009). Predictive coding under the free-energy principle. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 364(1521), 1211–1221. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0300 
 
52 
Fuster, Joaquin M. (2007). Jackson and the frontal executive hierarchy. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology: Official Journal of the International Organization of 
Psychophysiology, 64(1), 106–107. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2006.07.014 
Fuster, Joaquín M. (2006). The cognit: a network model of cortical representation. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology: Official Journal of the International 
Organization of Psychophysiology, 60(2), 125–132. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.12.015 
Fuster, Joaquín M. (2009). Cortex and memory: emergence of a new paradigm. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(11), 2047–2072. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21280 
Fuster, Joaquín M, & Bressler, S. L. (2012). Cognit activation: a mechanism enabling 
temporal integration in working memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.03.005 
Galef, B. G. (2009). What can function tell us about mechanism? Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution, 24(7), 357–358. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2009.02.002 
Galuske, R. A., Kim, D. S., Castrén, E., & Singer, W. (2000). Differential effects of 
neurotrophins on ocular dominance plasticity in developing and adult cat visual 
cortex. The European Journal of Neuroscience, 12(9), 3315–3330. 
Galuske, R. A., Kim, D. S., Castren, E., Thoenen, H., & Singer, W. (1996). Brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor reversed experience-dependent synaptic modifications in kitten 
visual cortex. The European Journal of Neuroscience, 8(7), 1554–1559. 
Gause, G. F. (1934). The Struggle for Existence. Courier Dover Publications. 
Geisler, W. S., & Diehl, R. L. (2002). Bayesian natural selection and the evolution of 
perceptual systems. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series 
B, Biological Sciences, 357(1420), 419–448. doi:10.1098/rstb.2001.1055 
George, D., & Hawkins, J. (2009). Towards a mathematical theory of cortical micro-circuits. 
PLoS Computational Biology, 5(10), e1000532. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000532 
Gerfen, C. R., & Surmeier, D. J. (2011). Modulation of Striatal Projection Systems by 
Dopamine. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 34(1), 441–466. doi:10.1146/annurev-
neuro-061010-113641 
Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances (Vol. Perceiving, pp. 67–82). 
Gilad, Y., Oshlack, A., Smyth, G. K., Speed, T. P., & White, K. P. (2006). Expression profiling in 
primates reveals a rapid evolution of human transcription factors. Nature, 
440(7081), 242–245. doi:10.1038/nature04559 
Gilbert, D. (2006). Stumbling on Happiness (1st ed.). Knopf. 
Glimcher, P. W. (2011). Understanding dopamine and reinforcement learning: the 
dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis. Proceedings of the National Academy 
 
53 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 108 Suppl 3, 15647–15654. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1014269108 
Gogtay, N., Giedd, J. N., Lusk, L., Hayashi, K. M., Greenstein, D., Vaituzis, A. C., … Thompson, P. 
M. (2004). Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood 
Through Early Adulthood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 101(21), 8174–8179. doi:10.1073/pnas.0402680101 
Gould, S. J. (1990). Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
Gould, S. J. (1992). The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History. W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. J. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London. Series B, Containing Papers of a Biological Character. Royal Society 
(Great Britain), 205(1161), 581–598. 
Gurney, K., Prescott, T. J., & Redgrave, P. (2001). A computational model of action selection 
in the basal ganglia. I. A new functional anatomy. Biological Cybernetics, 84(6), 401–
410. 
Gw, T., W, F., D, F., & M, B. (1995). Multi-attribute preference functions. Health Utilities 
Index. PharmacoEconomics, 7(6), 503. 
Hall, W. G., Arnold, H. M., & Myers, K. P. (2000). The acquisition of an appetite. Psychological 
Science, 11(2), 101–105. 
Haruno, M., & Kawato, M. (2006). Heterarchical reinforcement-learning model for 
integration of multiple cortico-striatal loops: fMRI examination in stimulus-action-
reward association learning. Neural Networks: The Official Journal of the 
International Neural Network Society, 19(8), 1242–1254. 
doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2006.06.007 
Haslberger, A., Varga, F., & Karlic, H. (2006). Recursive causality in evolution: a model for 
epigenetic mechanisms in cancer development. Medical Hypotheses, 67(6), 1448–
1454. doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2006.05.047 
Hawkins. (2011). Hierarchical Temporal Memory: including HTM Cortical Learning 
Algorithms. Whitepaper Numenta Inc. Retrieved from 
http://www.numenta.com/htm-
overview/education/HTM_CorticalLearningAlgorithms.pdf 
Hawkins, J., & Blakeslee, S. (2004). On Intelligence (Adapted.). Times Books. 
Hayek, F. A. (1952). The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical 
Psychology. University Of Chicago Press. 
 
54 
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory (New 
edition.). Psychology Press. 
Hennigan, A., O’Callaghan, R. M., & Kelly, A. M. (2007). Neurotrophins and their receptors: 
roles in plasticity, neurodegeneration and neuroprotection. Biochemical Society 
Transactions, 35(Pt 2), 424–427. doi:10.1042/BST0350424 
Henrich, J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale 
cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53(1), 3–35. 
doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00094-5 
Heylighen, F. (1992). Principles of Systems and Cybernetics: an evolutionary perspective. 
Heylighen, F. (1999). The Growth of Structural and Functional Complexity during Evolution. 
Heylighen, F., & Joslyn, C. (2003). Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics. In 
Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology (Third Edition) (pp. 155–169). New 
York: Academic Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0122274105001617 
Hirose. (2002). An ecological approach to embodiment and cognition. Cognitive Systems 
Research, 3(3), 289–299. doi:10.1016/S1389-0417(02)00044-X 
Hoebel, B. G. (1979). Hypothalamic self-stimulation and stimulation escape in relation to 
feeding and mating. Federation Proceedings, 38(11), 2454–2461. 
Hoffmann, H., Janssen, E., & Turner, S. L. (2004). Classical conditioning of sexual arousal in 
women and men: effects of varying awareness and biological relevance of the 
conditioned stimulus. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 33(1), 43–53. 
doi:10.1023/B:ASEB.0000007461.59019.d3 
Hofstadter, D. R. (1979). Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (Vol. 14). Basic Books. 
Holland, J. H. (1992). Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis 
with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved from 
http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=8929 
Honig, L. S., & Rosenberg, R. N. (2000). Apoptosis and neurologic disease. The American 
Journal of Medicine, 108(4), 317–330. 
Horton, J. C., & Adams, D. L. (2005). The cortical column: a structure without a function. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 360(1456), 
837–862. doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1623 
Houk, J. C., Bastianen, C., Fansler, D., Fishbach, A., Fraser, D., Reber, P. J., … Simo, L. S. (2007). 
Action selection and refinement in subcortical loops through basal ganglia and 
cerebellum. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 362(1485), 1573–1583. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2063 
 
55 
House, P. K., Vyas, A., & Sapolsky, R. (2011). Predator Cat Odors Activate Sexual Arousal 
Pathways in Brains of Toxoplasma gondii Infected Rats. PLoS ONE, 6(8), e23277. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023277 
Howarth, C., Gleeson, P., & Attwell, D. (2012). Updated energy budgets for neural 
computation in the neocortex and cerebellum. Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and 
Metabolism: Official Journal of the International Society of Cerebral Blood Flow and 
Metabolism. doi:10.1038/jcbfm.2012.35 
Huang, S. (2012). The molecular and mathematical basis of Waddington’s epigenetic 
landscape: a framework for post-Darwinian biology? BioEssays: News and Reviews in 
Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology, 34(2), 149–157. 
doi:10.1002/bies.201100031 
Humphries, M. ., Gurney, K., & Prescott, T. . (2007). Is there a brainstem substrate for action 
selection? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
362(1485), 1627 –1639. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2057 
Jablonka, E., & Lamb, M. J. (2007). Précis of Evolution in Four Dimensions. The Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 30(4), 353–365; discusssion 365–389. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X07002221 
Jackson, I. M. (1981). Evolutionary significance of the phylogenetic distribution of the 
mammalian hypothalamic releasing hormones. Federation Proceedings, 40(11), 
2545–2552. 
James, W. (1890). Psychology, briefer course. Franklin Library. 
JämsÄ, T. (2001). Jakob von Uexkülls theory of sign and meaning from a philosophical, 
semiotic, and linguistic point of view. Semiotica, 2001(134), 481–551. 
doi:10.1515/semi.2001.042 
Johansson, C., & Lansner, A. (2007). Towards cortex sized artificial neural systems. Neural 
Networks, 20(1), 48–61. doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2006.05.029 
Johnston, T. D., & Gottlieb, G. (1990). Neophenogenesis: a developmental theory of 
phenotypic evolution. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 147(4), 471–495. 
Jones, B. D. (1999). Bounded Rationality. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 297–321. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.297 
Jones, E. G., & Rakic, P. (2010). Radial Columns in Cortical Architecture: It Is the 
Composition That Counts. Cerebral Cortex, 20(10), 2261–2264. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhq127 
Jones, P. A., & Takai, D. (2001). The Role of DNA Methylation in Mammalian Epigenetics. 
Science, 293(5532), 1068–1070. doi:10.1126/science.1063852 
 
56 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 263–291. 
Kahneman, Daniel. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded 
rationality. American Psychologist, 58(9), 697–720. 
Kahneman, Daniel. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow (1st ed.). Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kahneman, Daniel, & Tversky, A. (2007). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–292. 
Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees know what others know, but not 
what they believe. Cognition, 109(2), 224–234. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010 
Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1993). Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value 
Tradeoffs. Cambridge University Press. 
Kiebel, S. J., Daunizeau, J., & Friston, K. J. (2008). A hierarchy of time-scales and the brain. 
PLoS Computational Biology, 4(11), e1000209. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209 
King, A. C., & Bjorklund, D. F. (2010). Evolutionary developmental psychology. Psicothema, 
22(1), 22–27. 
Kohl, J. V. (2012). Human pheromones and food odors: epigenetic influences on the 
socioaffective nature of evolved behaviors. Socioaffective Neuroscience & Psychology, 
2(0). doi:10.3402/snp.v2i0.17338 
Korn, H., & Faure, P. (2003). Is there chaos in the brain? II. Experimental evidence and 
related models. Comptes Rendus Biologies, 326(9), 787–840. 
Kozma, R., Puljic, M., Balister, P., Bollobas, B., & Freeman, W. (2004). Neuropercolation: A 
Random Cellular Automata Approach to Spatio-temporal Neurodynamics. In P. 
Sloot, B. Chopard, & A. Hoekstra (Eds.), Cellular Automata (Vol. 3305, pp. 435–443). 
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. Retrieved from 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/jq3d3uj89p9ql7cf/abstract/ 
Krieger, P., Kuner, T., & Sakmann, B. (2007). Synaptic connections between layer 5B 
pyramidal neurons in mouse somatosensory cortex are independent of apical 
dendrite bundling. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for 
Neuroscience, 27(43), 11473–11482. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1182-07.2007 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh : The Embodied Mind and Its 
Challenge to Western Thought. Basic Books. 
Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, F. J., & Feldman, M. W. (1999). Evolutionary consequences of 
niche construction and their implications for ecology. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 96(18), 10242–10247. 
Lane, N. (2005). Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life (1st ed.). Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
 
57 
Långsjö, J. W., Alkire, M. T., Kaskinoro, K., Hayama, H., Maksimow, A., Kaisti, K. K., … 
Scheinin, H. (2012). Returning from Oblivion: Imaging the Neural Core of 
Consciousness. The Journal of Neuroscience, 32(14), 4935–4943. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4962-11.2012 
Lansing, J. S., & Fox, K. M. (2011). Niche construction on Bali: the gods of the countryside. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 366(1566), 927–934. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0308 
Larsson, T. A., Olsson, F., Sundstrom, G., Lundin, L.-G., Brenner, S., Venkatesh, B., & 
Larhammar, D. (2008). Early vertebrate chromosome duplications and the evolution 
of the neuropeptide Y receptor gene regions. BMC Evolutionary Biology, 8, 184. 
doi:10.1186/1471-2148-8-184 
Le Magnen, J. (1998). Synthetic approach to the neurobiology of behaviour. Appetite, 31(1), 
1–8. doi:10.1006/appe.1998.0176 
Lefebvre, L. (2012). Primate encephalization. Progress in Brain Research, 195, 393–412. 
doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53860-4.00019-2 
Leknes, S., & Tracey, I. (2008). A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure. Nature 
Reviews. Neuroscience, 9(4), 314–320. doi:10.1038/nrn2333 
Lessells, C. K. M. (2008). Neuroendocrine control of life histories: what do we need to know 
to understand the evolution of phenotypic plasticity? Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 363(1497), 1589–1598. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.0008 
Lewis, K. E., Chen, W., & Schmidt, L. C. (Eds.). (2006). Decision Making in Engineering Design. 
Three Park Avenue New York, NY 10016-5990: ASME. Retrieved from 
http://asmedl.org/ebooks/asme/asme_press/802469/802469_ch12 
Lin, D., Boyle, M. P., Dollar, P., Lee, H., Perona, P., Lein, E. S., & Anderson, D. J. (2011). 
Functional identification of an aggression locus in the mouse hypothalamus. Nature, 
470(7333), 221–226. doi:10.1038/nature09736 
Lovecchio, E., Allegrini, P., Geneston, E., West, B. J., & Grigolini, P. (2012). From self-
organized to extended criticality. Frontiers in Physiology, 3, 98. 
doi:10.3389/fphys.2012.00098 
Lynch, M. (2010). Evolution of the mutation rate. Trends in Genetics: TIG, 26(8), 345–352. 
doi:10.1016/j.tig.2010.05.003 
Lynch, M. (2011). The lower bound to the evolution of mutation rates. Genome Biology and 
Evolution, 3, 1107–1118. doi:10.1093/gbe/evr066 
MacLean, P. D. (1983). BRAIN ROOTS OF THE WILL‐TO‐POWER. Zygon®, 18(4), 359–374. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.1983.tb00522.x 
 
58 
Mao, Z.-H., & Massaquoi, S. G. (2007). Dynamics of winner-take-all competition in recurrent 
neural networks with lateral inhibition. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks / a 
Publication of the IEEE Neural Networks Council, 18(1), 55–69. 
doi:10.1109/TNN.2006.883724 
Markram, H. (2006). The blue brain project. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 7(2), 153–160. 
doi:10.1038/nrn1848 
Markram, K., & Markram, H. (2010). The intense world theory - a unifying theory of the 
neurobiology of autism. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4, 224. 
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00224 
Marshall, A. (1925). Principles of economics: an introductory volume. Macmillan and 
Company, limited. 
Maynard Smith. (1982). Evolution and Theory of Games (Vol. 64). Cambridge University 
Press. 
Maynard Smith, J., & Szathmáry, E. (1995). The Major Transitions in Evolution (Vol. 19). 
Oxford University Press. 
McDowell, J. J. (2010). Behavioral and neural Darwinism: selectionist function and 
mechanism in adaptive behavior dynamics. Behavioural Processes, 84(1), 358–365. 
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2009.11.011 
McNally, L., Brown, S. P., & Jackson, A. L. (2012). Cooperation and the Evolution of 
Intelligence. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0206 
McNally, R. J. (1987). Preparedness and phobias: a review. Psychological Bulletin, 101(2), 
283–303. 
McNally, R. J. (1995). Preparedness, phobias, and the Panglossian paradigm. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 18(2), 303–304. 
Merker, B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: a challenge for neuroscience 
and medicine. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(1), 63–81; discussion 81–134. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X07000891 
Mesulam, M. M., & Mufson, E. J. (1982). Insula of the old world monkey. I. Architectonics in 
the insulo-orbito-temporal component of the paralimbic brain. The Journal of 
Comparative Neurology, 212(1), 1–22. doi:10.1002/cne.902120102 
Miller, J. A. (2007). Repeated evolution of male sacrifice behavior in spiders correlated with 
genital mutilation. Evolution; International Journal of Organic Evolution, 61(6), 
1301–1315. doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2007.00115.x 
Mills, R., & Watson, R. A. (2005). Genetic Assimilation and Canalisation in the Baldwin 
Effect. Advances in Artificial Life. 
 
59 
Mineka, S., & Ohman, A. (2002). Phobias and preparedness: the selective, automatic, and 
encapsulated nature of fear. Biological Psychiatry, 52(10), 927–937. 
Misevic, D., Kouyos, R. D., & Bonhoeffer, S. (2009). Predicting the Evolution of Sex on 
Complex Fitness Landscapes. PLoS Comput Biol, 5(9), e1000510. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000510 
Morris, J. S., Ohman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (1998). Conscious and unconscious emotional learning 
in the human amygdala. Nature, 393(6684), 467–470. doi:10.1038/30976 
Mountcastle, V. B. (1978). An organizing principle for cerebral function. (pp. 7–50). 
Mountcastle, V. B. (1997). The columnar organization of the neocortex. Brain: A Journal of 
Neurology, 120 ( Pt 4), 701–722. 
Murray, E. K., Hien, A., de Vries, G. J., & Forger, N. G. (2009). Epigenetic control of sexual 
differentiation of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis. Endocrinology, 150(9), 
4241–4247. doi:10.1210/en.2009-0458 
Nelson, R. (2007). Universal Darwinism and evolutionary social science. Biology and 
Philosophy, 22(1), 73–94. doi:10.1007/s10539-005-9005-7 
Northcutt, R. G. (1990). Ontogeny and phylogeny: a re-evaluation of conceptual 
relationships and some applications. Brain behavior and evolution, 36(2-3), 116–
140. 
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science (New York, N.Y.), 
314(5805), 1560–1563. doi:10.1126/science.1133755 
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2004). Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Science 
(New York, N.Y.), 303(5659), 793–799. doi:10.1126/science.1093411 
Odling-Smee, F. J., Laland, K. N., & Feldman, M. W. (2003). Niche Construction: The Neglected 
Process in Evolution. Princeton University Press. 
Ohman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: toward an evolved 
module of fear and fear learning. Psychological Review, 108(3), 483–522. 
Paladini, C. A., Celada, P., & Tepper, J. M. (1999). Striatal, pallidal, and pars reticulata evoked 
inhibition of nigrostriatal dopaminergic neurons is mediated by GABA(A) receptors 
in vivo. Neuroscience, 89(3), 799–812. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions 
(illustrated edition.). Oxford University Press, USA. 
Panksepp, J. (2011). Cross-species affective neuroscience decoding of the primal affective 
experiences of humans and related animals. PloS One, 6(9), e21236. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021236 
 
60 
Patalano, S., Hore, T. A., Reik, W., & Sumner, S. (2012). Shifting behaviour: epigenetic 
reprogramming in eusocial insects. Current Opinion in Cell Biology, 24(3), 367–373. 
doi:10.1016/j.ceb.2012.02.005 
Pataraia, E., Simos, P. G., Castillo, E. M., Billingsley-Marshall, R. L., McGregor, A. L., Breier, J. 
I., … Papanicolaou, A. C. (2004). Reorganization of Language-Specific Cortex in 
Patients with Lesions or Mesial Temporal Epilepsy. Neurology, 63(10), 1825–1832. 
doi:10.1212/01.WNL.0000144180.85779.9A 
Peelen, M. V., Glaser, B., Vuilleumier, P., & Eliez, S. (2009). Differential development of 
selectivity for faces and bodies in the fusiform gyrus. Developmental Science, 12(6), 
F16–25. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00916.x 
Pfaff, D. W., & Sakuma, Y. (1979). Facilitation of the lordosis reflex of female rats from the 
ventromedial nucleus of the hypothalamus. The Journal of Physiology, 288, 189–202. 
Pfaus, J. G., Kippin, T. E., Coria-Avila, G. A., Gelez, H., Afonso, V. M., Ismail, N., & Parada, M. 
(2012). Who, What, Where, When (and Maybe Even Why)? How the Experience of 
Sexual Reward Connects Sexual Desire, Preference, and Performance. Archives of 
Sexual Behavior, 41(1), 31–62. doi:10.1007/s10508-012-9935-5 
Pianka, E. R. (1970). On r-and K-selection. The American Naturalist, 104(940), 592–597. 
Pigliucci, M. (2009). An extended synthesis for evolutionary biology. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1168, 218–228. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04578.x 
Pine, A., Seymour, B., Roiser, J. P., Bossaerts, P., Friston, K. J., Curran, H. V., & Dolan, R. J. 
(2009). Encoding of marginal utility across time in the human brain. The Journal of 
Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 29(30), 9575–9581. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1126-09.2009 
Ploog, D. W. (2003). The place of the Triune Brain in psychiatry. Physiology & Behavior, 
79(3), 487–493. 
Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data? Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 59–63. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004 
Poldrack, R. A. (2008). The role of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience: where do we stand? 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 18(2), 223–227. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2008.07.006 
Poldrack, R. A. (2011). The future of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience. NeuroImage. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.08.007 
Premack, D. (1983). The Codes of Man and Beasts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(01), 
125–136. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00015077 
Preuss, T. M. (2011). The human brain: rewired and running hot. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1225 Suppl 1, E182–191. doi:10.1111/j.1749-
6632.2011.06001.x 
 
61 
Price, T. D., Qvarnström, A., & Irwin, D. E. (2003). The role of phenotypic plasticity in 
driving genetic evolution. Proceedings. Biological Sciences / The Royal Society, 
270(1523), 1433–1440. doi:10.1098/rspb.2003.2372 
Rabinovich, M. I., & Abarbanel, H. D. (1998). The role of chaos in neural systems. 
Neuroscience, 87(1), 5–14. 
Reader, S. M., Hager, Y., & Laland, K. N. (2011). The evolution of primate general and 
cultural intelligence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series 
B, Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 1017–1027. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0342 
Rendell, L., Fogarty, L., & Laland, K. N. (2011). Runaway cultural niche construction. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 366(1566), 823–835. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0256 
Reznick, D., Bryant, M. J., & Bashey, F. (2002). r- AND K-SELECTION REVISITED: THE ROLE 
OF POPULATION REGULATION IN LIFE-HISTORY EVOLUTION. Ecology, 83(6), 
1509–1520. doi:10.1890/0012-9658(2002)083[1509:RAKSRT]2.0.CO;2 
Richter, H. (2010). Evolutionary Optimization and Dynamic Fitness Landscapes. In I. 
Zelinka, S. Celikovsky, H. Richter, & G. Chen (Eds.),  (Vol. 267, pp. 409–446). Springer 
Berlin / Heidelberg. Retrieved from 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/m222l00356u72425/abstract/ 
Ridley, M. (1993). The red queen: Sex and the evolution of human nature. Harper Perennial. 
Retrieved from 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7AypMwk_TD0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA24
5&dq=ideas+have+sex+ridley&ots=RsQTSp9ook&sig=NQtGW4vlfq_JeDzm6X-
_KWXegos 
Robinson, S., Sandstrom, S. M., Denenberg, V. H., & Palmiter, R. D. (2005). Distinguishing 
whether dopamine regulates liking, wanting, and/or learning about rewards. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 119(1), 5–15. doi:10.1037/0735-7044.119.1.5 
Rudrauf, D., Lutz, A., Cosmelli, D., Lachaux, J.-P., & Le Van Quyen, M. (2003). From 
autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s exploration of the 
biophysics of being. Biological Research, 36(1), 27–65. 
Rutishauser, U., Douglas, R. J., & Slotine, J.-J. (2010). Collective Stability of Networks of 
Winner-Take-All Circuits. Neural Computation. doi:10.1162/NECO_a_00091 
Samuelson. (1938). A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour. Economica, 
51(17). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2548836 
Sawaragi, Y., Nakayama, H., & Tanino, T. (1985). Theory of multiobjective optimization. 
Academic Press. 
Schofield, T. M., Iverson, P., Kiebel, S. J., Stephan, K. E., Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., … Leff, A. P. 
(2009). Changing meaning causes coupling changes within higher levels of the 
 
62 
cortical hierarchy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 106(28), 11765–11770. doi:10.1073/pnas.0811402106 
Schott, G. D. (2011). Freud’s Project and Its Diagram: Anticipating the Hebbian Synapse. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 82(2), 122–125. 
doi:10.1136/jnnp.2010.220400 
Scott, J. (2010). Rational Choice Theory (Vol. 1, pp. 1–11). 
Segal, N. L., & MacDonald, K. B. (1998). Behavioral genetics and evolutionary psychology: 
unified perspective on personality research. Human Biology, 70(2), 159–184. 
Seligman, M. E. P. (1971). Phobias and preparedness. Behavior Therapy, 2(3), 307–320. 
doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(71)80064-3 
Seth, A. K., & Baars, B. J. (2005). Neural Darwinism and consciousness. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 14(1), 140–168. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.08.008 
Shatz, C. J. (1996). Emergence of order in visual system development. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 93(2), 602–608. 
Shay, J. (2010). From an unlicensed philosopher: reflections on brain, mind, society, 
culture--each other’s environments with equal “ontologic standing.” Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 1208, 32–37. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05797.x 
Shorter, J. (2010). Emergence and natural selection of drug-resistant prions. Molecular 
bioSystems, 6(7), 1115–1130. doi:10.1039/c004550k 
Simon, H. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
69(1), 99–118. doi:10.2307/1884852 
Simon, H., Egidi, M., Viale, R., & Marris, R. L. (2008). Economics, Bounded Rationality and the 
Cognitive Revolution. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Sisk, C. L., & Foster, D. L. (2004). The neural basis of puberty and adolescence. Nature 
Neuroscience, 7(10), 1040–1047. doi:10.1038/nn1326 
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1939-00056-000 
Slack, J. M. W. (2002). Conrad Hal Waddington: the last Renaissance biologist? Nature 
Reviews. Genetics, 3(11), 889–895. doi:10.1038/nrg933 
Smit, S. K., & Eiben, A. E. (2009). Comparing parameter tuning methods for evolutionary 
algorithms. In IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2009. CEC  ’09 (pp. 399 –
406). Presented at the IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2009. CEC  ’09. 
doi:10.1109/CEC.2009.4982974 
Smith, J. M. (1976). Evolution and the theory of games. American Scientist, 64(1), 41–45. 
 
63 
Smith, K. S., Berridge, K. C., & Aldridge, J. W. (2011). Disentangling pleasure from incentive 
salience and learning signals in brain reward circuitry. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(27), E255–264. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1101920108 
Sokolowski, K., & Corbin, J. G. (2012). Wired for behaviors: from development to function of 
innate limbic system circuitry. Frontiers in Molecular Neuroscience, 5. 
doi:10.3389/fnmol.2012.00055 
Song, S., Miller, K. D., & Abbott, L. F. (2000). Competitive Hebbian learning through spike-
timing-dependent synaptic plasticity. Nature Neuroscience, 3(9), 919–926. 
doi:10.1038/78829 
Stella, M., & Kleisner, K. (2010). Uexküllian Umwelt as science and as ideology: the light and 
the dark side of a concept. Theory in Biosciences = Theorie in Den Biowissenschaften, 
129(1), 39–51. doi:10.1007/s12064-010-0081-0 
Stephenson-Jones, M., Ericsson, J., Robertson, B., & Grillner, S. (2012). Evolution of the basal 
ganglia; Dual output pathways conserved throughout vertebrate phylogeny. The 
Journal of Comparative Neurology. doi:10.1002/cne.23087 
Struhsaker, T. T., Cooney, D. O., & Siex, K. S. (1997). Charcoal Consumption by Zanzibar Red 
Colobus Monkeys: Its Function and Its Ecological and Demographic Consequences. 
International Journal of Primatology, 18(1), 61–72. doi:10.1023/A:1026341207045 
Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2007). The dynamic changes in roles of learning through the Baldwin 
effect. Artificial Life, 13(1), 31–43. doi:10.1162/artl.2007.13.1.31 
Takeuchi, N., Hogeweg, P., & Koonin, E. V. (2011). On the origin of DNA genomes: evolution 
of the division of labor between template and catalyst in model replicator systems. 
PLoS Computational Biology, 7(3), e1002024. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002024 
Takeuchi, N., Salazar, L., Poole, A. M., & Hogeweg, P. (2008). The evolution of strand 
preference in simulated RNA replicators with strand displacement: implications for 
the origin of transcription. Biology Direct, 3, 33. doi:10.1186/1745-6150-3-33 
Tetz, V. V. (2005). The pangenome concept: a unifying view of genetic information. Medical 
Science Monitor: International Medical Journal of Experimental and Clinical Research, 
11(7), HY24–29. 
Thompson, E. (2006). Neurophenomenology and Francisco Varela. Harvard University 
Press. 
Thompson, N. S. (1998). Reintroducing “Reintroducing group selection to the human 
behavioral sciences”to BBS readers. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(02), 304–305. 
doi:null 
Tinbergen, N. (1963). On aims and methods of Ethology. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 
20(4), 410–433. doi:10.1111/j.1439-0310.1963.tb01161.x 
 
64 
Tomasello, M. (1999). THE HUMAN ADAPTATION FOR CULTURE. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 28(1), 509–529. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.509 
Toni, R., Malaguti, A., Benfenati, F., & Martini, L. (2004). The human hypothalamus: a 
morpho-functional perspective. Journal of Endocrinological Investigation, 27(6 
Suppl), 73–94. 
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990). On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of 
the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation. Journal of Personality, 58(1), 17–
67. 
Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006). Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
103(29), 10952–10955. doi:10.1073/pnas.0602530103 
Trepel, C., Fox, C. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2005). Prospect theory on the brain? Toward a 
cognitive neuroscience of decision under risk. Brain Research, 23(1), 34–50. 
Ullén, F. (2009). Is activity regulation of late myelination a plastic mechanism in the human 
nervous system? Neuron Glia Biology, 5(1-2), 29–34. 
doi:10.1017/S1740925X09990330 
Valentin, V. V., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2009). Overlapping prediction errors in dorsal striatum 
during instrumental learning with juice and money reward in the human brain. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 102(6), 3384–3391. doi:10.1152/jn.91195.2008 
Van Rossum, M. C., Bi, G. Q., & Turrigiano, G. G. (2000). Stable Hebbian learning from spike 
timing-dependent plasticity. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the 
Society for Neuroscience, 20(23), 8812–8821. 
Von Neumann. (1966). Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata. University of Illinois Press. 
Von Neumann, & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Vol. 2). 
Princeton University Press. 
Von Uexküll, J. (1957). A stroll through the worlds of animals and men (Vol. 4, pp. 5–80). 
Waddington, C. H. (1953a). Genetic assimilation of an acquired character. Evolution, 7(2), 
118–126. doi:10.2307/2405747 
Waddington, C. H. (1953b). The’Baldwin Effect,’Genetic Assimilation’and’Homeostasis’. 
Evolution, 7(4), 386–387. 
Wagner, G. P., & Laubichler, M. D. (2004). Rupert Riedl and the re-synthesis of evolutionary 
and developmental biology: body plans and evolvability. Journal of Experimental 
Zoology. Part B, Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 302(1), 92–102. 
doi:10.1002/jez.b.20005 
 
65 
Watabe-Uchida, M., Zhu, L., Ogawa, S. K., Vamanrao, A., & Uchida, N. (2012). Whole-Brain 
Mapping of Direct Inputs to Midbrain Dopamine Neurons. Neuron, 74(5), 858–873. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.03.017 
Waters, D. P. (2011). Von Neumann’s Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata: A Useful 
Framework for Biosemiotics? Biosemiotics, onlin 25 J. doi:10.1007/s12304-011-
9127-z 
Watson, K. K. (2008). Evolution, Risk, and Neural Representation. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1128(1), 8–12. doi:10.1196/annals.1399.002 
Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S., & Hopper, L. M. (2009). Emulation, imitation, 
over-imitation and the scope of culture for child and chimpanzee. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 364(1528), 
2417–2428. doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0069 
Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current 
Evolutionary Thought. Princeton University Press. 
Wilson, D. S. (1994). Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(04), f1–f8. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00036086 
Windridge, D., & Kittler, J. (2010). Perception-action learning as an epistemologically-
consistent model for self-updating cognitive representation. Advances in 
Experimental Medicine and Biology, 657, 95–134. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-79100-5_6 
Wolfram, S. (2002). A New Kind of Science (1st ed.). Wolfram Media. 
Wright. (1932). The roles of mutation, inbreeding, crossbreeding and selection in evolution. 
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Genetics, 1(6), 356–366. 
Wright, S. (1982). The shifting balance theory and macroevolution. Annual Review of 
Genetics, 16, 1–19. doi:10.1146/annurev.ge.16.120182.000245 
Wyckoff, G. J. (1987). Neural Darwinism: The Theory Of Neuronal Group Selection (First 
Edition.). Basic Books. 
Ziemke, T., & Sharkey, N. E. (2001). A stroll through the worlds of robots and animals: 
Applying Jakob von Uexkülls theory of meaning to adaptive robots and artificial life. 
Semiotica, 2001(134), 701–746. doi:10.1515/semi.2001.050 
 
